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PART I Sexual violence in war – combining development 
and gender perspectives 
 
1.0 Introduction 
As far as we know, sexual violence has been present and relatively common in most of 
the human history and various cultures, but varies both in motivations and extent of 
the abuses between peacetime and wartime. However, due to under-reporting and 
neglect of the subject the true extent of sexual violence is practically unknown in all 
conflicts. Sexual violence has for a long time been viewed as an unfortunate by-
product of war or a private crime by a dishonourable soldier. But rape and other forms 
of sexual violence in conflicts has in several cases also been a part of a strategic plan 
for proclaiming victory over an enemy or as a part of ethnic cleansing and genocide. In 
the former Yugoslavia, the genocide plan by the Serbian leaders towards the Muslim 
population included a gender-selective strategy that incorporated killings of non-
combatant battle-age men and rape of “their” women with the goal of impregnation 
(Jones, 2006:8). Other motivations for sexual violence can be revenge as demonstrated 
in the final stages of World War II when Russian soldiers raped hundreds of thousands 
of women when entering and subsequently occupying Germany (Goldstein, 2001:362). 
However, sexual violence rarely happened among the hundreds of thousand of Jewish 
women in the German Nazi camps by German soldiers, despite unequal power 
relations (Mørk, 2007:25). The explanation for this can be that both sexual violence 
and intercourse between a German and a Jew was illegal. Thus the extent and use of 
sexual violence in war has historically depended on the context, for instance 
ideological goals or the cultural setting.  
 
The effectiveness of mass-rape in war will vary from case to case, but most if not all of 
the victims will suffer from physical, psychological and/or social consequences that 
further affects the society in various ways. For instance in many developing countries, 
physical damages like prolepsis and the spread of HIV/AIDS has been and continues 
to be a deadly effect of the widespread incidents of sexual violence in conflicts and is 
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inefficiently dealt with by authorities. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 
former Zaire, is an example of this and can to some extent reveal the true spread of 
abuse.  
 
From the beginning and throughout the development of international criminal law in 
the post-WWII era, sexual violence was categorized as a crime, for instance, in the 
1949 Geneva Convention or the 1984 Torture Convention.1 Despite its status as a 
crime against humanity, discriminatory attitudes by military and political leaders 
during times of war has often resulted in the perception that sexual violence is more 
incidental or less serious an offence. In countries like the DRC and Liberia, a 
kleptocratic state and high level of impunity have hampered the development of a 
juridical system in addition to creating distrust among the population towards the state. 
To discuss this in a theoretical context, I have chosen to use development perspectives 
to understand the outbreak of war and the use of sexual violence as methods of war in 
the DRC and to some extent Liberia.  
 
At the more individual level, men and women will experience war differently based on 
their role in society and their different vulnerability to various forms of violence. Adult 
men will to a larger extent than women be vulnerable to battle-deaths due to their more 
likely participation in combat. Women and girls, on the other hand, will be far more 
vulnerable to sexual violence than men. Thus, a gender analysis is needed to explain 
the various forms of gender-based violence (GBV) towards men and women. We also 
need to look at some of the components in terms of the relation between men and 
women in the DRC and Liberia to fully understand sexual violence. Gender analysis 
has often focused on women’s special needs in conflicts and forced policymakers to 
prioritize women and girls (The Human Security Report, 2005:111). However, women 
have often been labelled in a category of women and children, thus giving women a 
largely passive and victimized role that is too simplistic. The agency role of both 
women and men is important to recognise them as responsible persons, i.e. to act or 
refuse to act. For example, measured in published articles about women that take up 
                                               
1
 Human Rights Watch news accessed 2007-11-27at http://hrw.org/english/docs/1998/09/02/rwanda1311.htm  
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arms or contribute to war in other ways compared to men has been largely ignored 
(Zarkov, 2007:191). At the same time, violence against men in gender analysis has 
been a much neglected field. Another aspect is that gender analysis is often discussed 
theoretically, often far away from the actual targets and is rarely sufficiently 
implemented and integrated in conflict resolution, emergency aid and development 
projects. Thus, the efforts of the more post-modern development debate will be used to 
critically discuss gender analysis where the traditional theories of essentialism and 
constructivism are insufficient.  
 
The research questions this thesis will address is:  
How can the use of sexual violence by military and rebel groups be understood during 
the war in the DRC? Can the efforts in Liberia to bring an end to impunity for sexual 
violence be meaningfully replicated in the DRC? 
 
The focus on understanding the perpetrators are by no means to excuse their act, but 
rather to understand the humanity of the perpetrators to learn about people’s 
motivation for committing inhumane acts. Sexual violence is by many stated to be 
endemic in the DRC and Liberia with devastating effect on reconciliation and future 
development for a country. I have chosen this comparison first and foremost because 
Liberia has been portrayed as a “poster child” in terms of the government’s 
commitment to stop widespread sexual violence. Further, the two countries share 
many similarities because they are situated in Sub-Saharan Africa; they have a recent 
history of dictatorship rule, and a history of violence and war. Most central perhaps is 
that sexual violence in both cases appears to be endemic during Liberia’s civil war and 
the war in the DRC. They both have had their first democratic election and the two 
states can be seen as fragile, post-conflict societies. However, the two cases are also 
different in many ways, because Liberia has never been colonized and the country has 
a rather recent history and are less prone to relapse into war and armed conflict 
compared to the DRC. Another aspect is that Liberia has a female president, Ellen 
Johnson-Sirleaf, who has actively worked out and implemented a law that specifically 
prohibit gender-based violence. However, it remains to see if the Liberian model is 
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sufficient for putting an end to sexual violence and if so meaningfully replicated in the 
DRC.   
2.0 Theoretical approach and methodological concerns   
The term ‘sexual violence’ is used in the literature as an umbrella concept for a 
number of sexual abuses like rape, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, sexual 
mutilation, and genocidal rape. The choice of such a wide term in this analysis is 
useful because the reports from attacks in the DRC as well as Liberia tend to be less 
specific of the acts and often tend to compromise extreme brutality where rape is only 
one part of the act. In many cases reported in the DRC, rape, mutilation and torture 
occurs together as one combined act of violence. In addition, there is no reliable data 
on the various methods of sexual violence that was used in the former Yugoslavia or in 
the Rwandan cases. In this thesis ‘sexual violence’ is the term that will be used to refer 
to these types of sexually related violence in the DRC and Liberia. Though the 
individual reaction to sexual violence can be similar, sexual violence as a weapon in 
war implies a differentiation from peace-time sexual violence and other forms of 
weapon in war. However, there are no unitary definitions of weapons in war as they 
can diverge from conventional weapons and not all weapons in a conventional sense 
are weapons of war (Skjelsbæk, 2001:213). For example can attacking people’s food 
security during civil war be a weapon to destabilize the situation, while the use of 
media to the spread sympathy and propaganda can be an un-conventional weapon in 
war. The term gender is in this thesis understood as socially constructed ideas about 
men and women’s role in the society. This means that gender is not equivalent to sex, 
something we are, but rather something appropriate to one sex (Skjelsbæk, 2001:224). 
 
Explaining the use of sexual violence as weapon in war can be structured at the highest 
level, i.e. the context of the conflict and the national level. In theoretical terms this 
includes the overall goal and character of the war and the use of sexual violence as a 
military strategy. It also includes a sense of nationalism towards foreign influence, 
which can be particularly relevant for the DRC case. At the second level, group 
identity and interactions will be of central concern as this id often where most cases of 
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sexual violence is found. The lowest level is the individual level where individual 
choice for using sexual violence can be explained. These levels will be used in the 
analysis of understanding the first research question and the levels should be seen as 
dynamic and interacting. The reasons for using sexual violence, as we will see, are 
numerous and often are a result of the combination of many factors. An ethical 
concern here of this type of research is that somehow a criminal act with such 
devastating consequences can be explained and hence excused. But this is by no means 
the intention of this research. The intention is rather to understand some of the 
motivations for a type of violence that is poorly understood in much of the peace and 
conflict literature. Further, the failure to acknowledge women as central stakeholders 
in conflict diverge attention from some of the key aspects to the ending war and re-
building the society.  
 
The structure of the theoretical chapter is first to discuss the state-level using 
development approaches. Central aspects here will be to understand causes for 
violence in the context of poverty and war. The second part will discuss some of the 
gender perspectives to see what can be the causes of gender-based violence in war. 
This will include discussions of the two traditional approaches essentialism and 
constructivism. The last theoretical section will combine the development and gender 
debate through the more bottom-up approaches centred in the development debate, like 
gender equality, capabilities and human rights to contextualize more the case of the 
DRC and Liberia.  
2.1 Development perspectives  
The term ‘development’ is a concept often related to a long-term change and progress 
in a society. For decades since the post-WWII era, the development debate was led by 
the neoliberal school, including the modernization theory, and the structuralist school, 
including neo-Marxist approaches (Thomas, 2006:197). The domination of the two 
schools should be seen in the historical context of the Cold War and the ideological 
dispute between capitalist market economy and dependency thinking. Thus the term 
development can be understood in relation to the power and agency of the 
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‘developers’. Further, a definition of development could fail to incorporate all of the 
ways it has been used and/or would end up too wide to have any analytical purposes. 
A simplistic definition like ‘a positive change’ could at first glance seem like an all-
encompassing description. However, the term positive is ambiguous: What is a 
positive change and for whom is it positive for? A traditional dichotomy is economic 
growth, a positive change, versus environmental sustainability, a negative effect of a 
positive change in another sector that eventually can cause a long-term negative 
change. More complex debates have evolved throughout the experience of 
development efforts and since the collapse of the communist regimes. Today’s 
conceptualization of development is significantly more combined with empirical 
research as well as historical context understandings (Chabal & Daloz, 1999:11).   
 
According to Thomas (2006:196), present-day development agencies have taken a 
more restricted meaning of development as amelioration. In this sense, development 
incorporates small improvements in human development often associated with the 
Millennium Development Goals and peacekeeping interventions to halt conflicts from 
getting out of hand. In the long run, however, the vision of development usually 
implies a democratic and liberal society as developed in the Western world and rarely 
an alternative social transformation linked to dependency thinking or alternative 
development. In most cases, the traditional development models assume development 
to be equal to modernization. However, critiques from the culturalist perspective have 
emphasized the lack of understanding for socio-cultural settings as in the Sub-Saharan 
region in Africa under so-called “good governance” models. The culturalist 
perspective emphasizes the informal structures of African countries where the private 
and public sphere is more blurred than the Western ideal of a state (Eriksen, 2001:29). 
Two authors of the culturalist perspective, Chabal & Daloz (1999:39), argue that 
traditional development thinking take for granted that African societies ultimately will 
become westernized. According to the authors, the Western-style democracy simply 
does not capture the contemporary dynamics of the informal or personalized politics of 
representation and asymmetrical reciprocity in the Sub-Saharan region. Rather they 
argue that we can see a transition towards modernity without development. But how 
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can this be possible when development is usually so closely linked modernization? 
Can it be both undeveloped and modern? Chabal & Daloz (1999:144-5) argue that the 
there is nowhere in the world where presence of the traditional and the modern at the 
same time is more striking. For instance, some Africans relatively quickly adopt 
modern technologies like cell phones and computers, but at the same time are locked 
in what Western societies might perceive as “backward” social and psychological 
statehood, e.g. witchcraft or polygamy. However, the authors argue that this in itself is 
not sufficient to explain the presences of modernity in Africa as the continent has not 
yet achieved sufficient economic and technological modernity compared to the 
Western development. Instead, they see modernity as something more dynamic and 
not something solely measured in Western standards. Bayart (in Eriksen, 2001:27) 
argues that the informal structure where elite’s strive to control resources is closely 
linked to the external world. In order to acquire resources, the elites have become 
experts in manoeuvring profits from aid agencies, other government and international 
organizations. The culturalist approach often emphasizes the type of rule in many 
African societies as neo-patrimonialism. Braathen et al (2000:11) defines this concept 
as “a mixed type of rule combining in various degrees differentiation and lack of 
separation between public and private spheres”. The state system is differentiated 
through the structure but not in terms of function, which implies that in post-colonial 
African state patrimonialism and bureaucracy co-exists. The state can extract the 
necessary resources but in a privatized manner to the privileged elite. One of the 
results is that politics becomes the entry to extract economic resources and thus a form 
of business. Further, in poorly regulated societies in Africa, where there is a lack of 
institutionalised or social rule of law, violent crimes are more likely to occur. Not only 
is the state weak and fails to protect its citizens, it is also responsible for violence and 
crimes. In these societies, warlords profit from continues fighting. However, the 
brutality of violence in the DRC and Liberia makes it difficult to understand how this 
has anything to do with profit or other gains. How can the rape and subsequent murder 
of babies and cutting off a person’s limbs be an instrument for profit? One possible 
explanation can be that terror induces fear that implies that in future less energy will 
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be needed to suppress opposition as people are fearful that they will experience the 
same fate. The violent act thus has a future threat dimension to it.  
 
A common understanding of lack of security in African states as the DRC is ‘state 
failure’ or ‘state collapse’, concepts increasingly discussed in the post Cold-War area. 
To understand the state-level analysis, we need to take some steps back and consider 
the Western Europe’s development in state formation. The states in Western Europe 
were developed over centuries in complex processes of socio-historical development. 
According to Chabal & Daloz (2006:227-229) this development implied four 
fundamental changes. First, a process of centralization of a dominant House took place 
and meant the end of competing power units. Second, it meant the monopolization of 
military means and eventually monopolization of legitimate violence, both internally 
and externally. During the Middle Ages, war was a way of gaining resources and 
implied ad hoc coalitions based on kinship or exchange relations. Third, the process 
involved a differentiation between the public and private sphere and the establishment 
of bureaucracy. The recruitment to the bureaucracy was based on competence and 
merit and not personal allegiance as in the patrimonial system. Lastly, there was the 
development of institutionalization that included codification of written laws valid for 
all citizens and legal responsibilities for those in the political and bureaucratic office.  
 
The so-called state failure in the DRC would imply that, based on these criteria, the 
state failed to develop according to the Western model. However, the state had never 
been a strong bureaucracy and was even facing a downward spiral during the Zairen-
period (Tull, 2006:113). The state was rather based on informal power relations and 
control over the illegal market. According to Tull (2006:114), the Zairian state’s main 
concern was control over the internal market and exclusive state power, but the central 
government was not prepared for external threats. What collapsed when insurgents 
entered the DRC was the informal networks and not the formal state structure, 
according to Tull. The state had hardly offered any public services and bureaucracy 
and national army had never existed in the traditional sense. The lack of a ‘state’ 
resulted in lack of security towards the citizens and thus a failure to protect its people 
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and punish violators. However the problem is that the state-failure concept is used 
more as a description by Western policymakers than an analytical explanation, 
according to Bøås & Dunn (2007:19). The concept of state protection is also a Western 
concept, but in traditional African systems it is the social systems that protect its 
members. Ethnic and clan links are therefore more important than ‘national 
citizenship’, as that is where your security derives from. This can also partly explain 
why sexual violence against ‘the other’, meaning another group, would be regarded as 
legitimate, whilst sexual violence against the same group would be regarded as a social 
crime and dealt with by traditional justice systems. Bøås & Dunn (ibid) argue that the 
Zairian state under the Mobutu dictatorship can be seen as both strong and weak at the 
same time. It was strong in the sense that the regime was durable and rather stable 
through thirty years. But on the other side, the authors argue that the breakdown of the 
state was the result of the neo-patrimonial system took complete dominance and hence 
lost all sense of integration and legitimacy. Further, when the neo-patrimonial state 
fails to distribute resources in the patron-client relationship, frustration and resentment 
among the domestic society emerged. According to Bøås (2007:45), the state’s failure 
to provide for its citizens, has created large segments of marginalized people in the 
economic and political life. Bøås argue that this leads to an intensified battle over the 
political life in terms of the distribution of identities, resources, ideas and positions.  
 
Instead of the narrow interpretation of the state as the central actor, Bøås & Dunn 
(2007:31) emphasize the centrality of identity and belonging in explaining today’s 
warfare in Africa, issues that traditional political science have not been concerned 
about. The debate on identity and belonging to land and other resources in the eastern 
DRC as well as Liberia has shown devastating effects of real and perceived 
marginalization and poverty, according to the authors. Seeing yourself as 
‘autochthony’ or ‘son of the soil’ and your counterparts as ‘allochthony’ or ‘strangers’ 
can entitle you to a struggle over the resources. They argue that this struggle should be 
seen with the influence of unfinished nation-building under Mobutu in the post-
colonial state. The danger of categorizing people into ‘owners’ and ‘aliens’ is that 
extremely violent measures can be legitimized. Vetlesen (2005:174) states that 
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measures taken against the out-group are not seen as morally bad or neutral, but fully 
good and legitimate. The pre-existing gender inequalities in the DRC might increase 
the brutality towards female members of an out-group, as they are not only outside the 
moral universe of the perpetrators but below the status of the out-group men. We turn 
now to gender perspectives to seek theoretical approaches in understanding sexual 
violence.  
 
2.2 Gender perspectives  
When explaining sexual violence it is virtually impossible to not discuss gender 
aspects. The reason is that most victims are women and most perpetrators are men in 
addition to the fact that sexual violence is a gender-based criminal act. With gender 
perspectives on sexual violence, explanations for targeted sexual violence and 
resulting impunity can be sought. Essentialism and constructivism are two approaches 
that are often discussed in the sexual violence literature. Further, the thesis will include 
three interrelated approaches to gender perspectives and development, namely gender 
equality, human rights and capability approaches to understand sexual violence in the 
DRC and Liberia. These three approaches highlight different aspects of gender and 
sexual violence. By gender equality, the unequal relation between men and women and 
their status in society are discussed. Gender equality or rather gender inequality is one 
approach to explain causes of rape and other forms of sexual violence against women 
in the DRC and Liberia. The view of women and girls as a ‘property’ is one area that 
represents the gender inequality in societies and is also closely linked to Veblen’s 
analysis referred to below. When it comes to human rights, aspects of law and 
impunity based on the needs of the poor and excluded are central. Capability is a 
concept often used to discuss sociological processes of discrimination towards people 
because of their characteristic, like gender and ethnicity, and their exclusion from 
decision-making processes.    
2.2.1 Introducing gender in the debate 
Though the gender approaches can be seen as relatively new and is still being refined, 
whilst at the same time being mainstreamed in today’s development debate, writers 
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have for centuries discussed gender and gender relations. One of those is Thorstein 
Veblen (1899) in his classical book “The theory of the leisure class”. He argues that 
ownership of goods appears to be some of the oldest and most common features of 
dominance among people in a society. Consumption and ownership of goods changes 
with economic development and Veblen (1899:60) used the term conspicuous 
consumption to describe cultural and social behavioural change. Of particular 
relevance when discussing gender perspectives is what Veblen (1899:52) claims is the 
oldest form of ownership, namely persons and primarily women. According to Veblen 
there are three main reasons for acquiring persons as property. First, it is a way of 
dominance and coercion. Second, their utility represents the owner’s superior strength 
and, third, the utility of their services. Veblen argues that women (and slaves) 
represent both a symbol of wealth and a way of accommodating wealth. According to 
Veblen, this human relation is a system of master and slaves, and an accepted form of 
wealth is the possession of many women. He believes that this is especially a finding 
in patriarchal societies where women are conceived as chattels. In these societies, 
women should only consume what is a minimum of sustaining her life with the 
exception of consumption that can benefit the comfort of her master.  Men, on the 
other hand, can freely consume any goods including weapons, amusements, and 
divinities and Veblen argues that a failure to consume such goods marks the men as 
inferior and demerit. Women are regarded as the ‘property’ or the possession of men in 
many African society and results in them being perceived more as objects than as 
persons worthy of respect in their own individual right, and also makes them more 
vulnerable to attack as indirect representations of their men or symbols of their group.    
2.2.2 Essentialism and constructivism  
To better understand the motivation for using sexual violence as a weapon in war, the 
conflicting theoretical approaches essentialism and constructivism will be used. The 
American writer and feminist Susan Brownmiller (1975) was one of the first who 
wrote about sexual violence in war. Brownmiller’s (1975:4) empirical focus is all 
women in the world and their structural vulnerability for becoming victims of sexual 
abuse in both peace-time and war. She claims that men’s structural capacity to rape in 
 15 
combination with women’s structural vulnerability to become a victim of rape is as 
primary as the act of sex itself. However, in the war-zone, certain rules apply where 
men are not only men, but militaristic men and allow the perfect condition for men to 
let out their contempt for women, according to Brownmiller (1975:24).  Within such a 
context, it is assumed that it will be easier for men to commit acts of sexual violence 
and it becomes a way of sustaining the patriarchal structure of the society.   She argues 
that perpetrators are ordinary men made unordinary by the admission in the exclusive 
male-club: The military. Brownmiller further argues that the rape of the ‘men’s 
women’ is the ultimate humiliation and a symbol of the nation’s defeat. In 
Brownmiller’s deterministic understanding, wartime rape is perceived as a normal part 
of any war strategy.  
 
Brownmiller’s argumentation has later received substantial critique, especially from 
the empirical evidence of the 1990’s genocide in Rwanda and Bosnia and the 
development of a more nuanced understanding of perpetrators’ perspective. Allan 
(1996:88) criticizes the way Brownmiller reduces culture to patriarchy alone and 
ignores the empirical finding that both sexes can be perpetrators and victims of sexual 
violence. The Serb’s genocidal instrument during the Bosnian war was to 
systematically target the Muslims to destroy an entire culture and their future. Here, 
forced impregnation was a major weapon to achieve the goal of genocide. Skjelsbæk 
(2001:218) argues that Brownmiller’s assumption that militarized masculinity in a 
patriarchy cannot alone explain why some women are targeted and others not and how 
men also can become victims. Further, it simplifies a complex transaction between 
perpetrators and victims, when only explaining the perpetrators motivation and 
pacifies the victim as a bystander. Perhaps the most devastating for academic analysis 
is that essentialism supports a polarized framework where men are equated with war 
and aggression while women are inherently peaceful and nurturing (Strickland & 
Duvvury, 2003:9).  
 
The constructivist approach has a specific focus on how certain groups are targeted in 
war, where the sense of identity is of central consideration. The idea of identity and the 
 16 
feeling of belonging to a group are the source of pride and strength, yet also a source 
to rape and kill. The within-group solidarity can foster a between-group friction, like 
Hutus were informed to hate Tutsis during the genocide in 1994. The encouraged 
violence that is associated with identity conflicts seem to repeat and persist from 
Rwanda to the DRC. The goal of ‘dirty wars’ as most famously seen in Bosnia and 
Rwanda is often to terrorize the population to achieve a political goal, where violence 
and killing of the most vulnerable groups can be a way of inflicting most terror. To 
dehumanize the perceived enemy by humiliating both the body and the person is both 
a mean and goal in such wars. However, the violent aggression from political actors 
can be seen as a sign of political decay. But perhaps this combination of violence and 
political weakness is a point when harming civilians, especially women, is a low 
military costs at the same time that it has a high social trauma cost.  
 
Allan (1996:28) argues that there exist certain constructed ideas about masculinity as a 
symbol of power and dominance and femininity as the contrary.  When using sexual 
violence in war, the perpetrators and victim will have a symbolic transaction of 
identities where the perpetrator becomes masculinized by empowering his or hers 
identity and the victim feminized by victimizing his or hers identity. This perception is 
in sharp contrast with the essentialist view where women and men have a static 
identity of femininity and masculinity respectively. Skjelsbæk (1999:7) argues that 
women represent the traditional transmitters of culture with their role in the family and 
the society. Thus, targeting women is not an attack on the individual victim but rather 
on women’s cultural role. The idea is that this will break down the social fabric of a 
society and hence break down resistance. As Skjelsbæk (2001:228) states, the feelings 
of shame, fear, guilt and taboo is precisely what makes sexual violence so effective by 
silencing the victim. Surviving such an act can be perceived as a destiny worse than 
death because the victim’s suffering is prolonged and reinforced and can deter the 
persons from returning to a normal life (Vetlesen, 2005:197).  Rational thinking should 
be that the perpetrator feels shame about the act, but the reaction is often that it is the 
victim who feels shame. 
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According to Sen (2006:2), unequal treatment of women in relation to men and sexual 
violence against women are able to persist through unquestioning acceptance of 
adopted beliefs. Vetlesen (2005:198-9) argues that survival of constructed perceptions 
about gender identity and femininity and masculinity is a power tool to conduct such 
atrocities as sexual violence. The gender identities are associated with strength as 
opposed to weakness and the power to control versus the weakness of being 
controlled. Further, the actual plurality of identities that people share can be narrowed 
down to a few during war, and such sharp categorizations can have explosive results. 
Gender roles can often become more enhanced during war as men are forced to fight 
and women are left to take care of her family. Real and constructed identities can 
determine who is defined as an insider and who are aliens and ultimately separates 
family and friends from each other. Vetlesen (ibid) argues that the perpetrators are 
acting in selective universe where those who are not a part of the universe, the out-
group, are also outside their moral responsibility. The killing of a person can be the 
result of perceiving him or her as only having one identity, i.e. the identity as a 
member of the ‘enemy’ group. Further, the poorer members of this group can be the 
easiest targets to kill or rape as they live in scanty shelters and need to go out 
unprotected in a hostile environment in order to provide for daily necessities. On the 
other side, however, people living on the margin of society more easily can join 
guerrilla groups as they have little to loose and potentially much more to gain by 
taking up arms. Thus, the strong reliance on social and group identity, and the role of 
the social group as the primary provider of security, and the moral limitations of 
applying social norms narrowly to the group, all result in a greater likelihood that 
when two groups come into conflict, the men will be killed and the women – as 
symbols of the men and the group – be abused. The following chapter will combine 
the development context and gender perspectives to better suit the cases.  
 
2.3 The post-modern development debate and its buzz-words 
Women’s participation in political processes and their implications of institutional and 
policy changes have as recently at the 1980’s been ignored by political scientists, 
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according to Randall (2002:114). Now, new generations of gender researchers have 
started a post-modern debate of interpreting the gender dynamics. Many of the 
concepts like human rights and equality is nothing new in theoretical terms, but 
perhaps the inclusion and mainstreaming of the expressions are much more used in the 
post-modern development debate. For instance Mary Wollstonecraft’s book “A 
Vindication of the Rights of Women” from 1792 and the Human Rights Declaration 
from 1948 are two of many examples of publications about individual and women 
rights. However, the debates about women’s rights have changed more from focus on 
women’s well-being to their agency. From being passive receivers of emergency and 
welfare aid, women’s active role leading to social transformation for both women and 
men is increasingly emphasized in the development debate (Sen, 1999:87). The 
subsequent section can preferably sum up some of the development and gender 
debates discussed above to create a more inclusive framework for analysis about 
sexual violence in fragile states.  
 
Gender inequality, human rights and the capability approach are all closely entwined. 
The capability approach can be seen as one of the 1990’s and onwards most important 
in understanding people-centred development. The capability approach is simply 
stated about what people can and cannot do in their social, economic and political 
surroundings.  Sen (1999) is perhaps one of the most famous contributors of the 
capability approach to development. His understanding of capabilities refers to various 
combinations of functionings that are possible to achieve (Sen, 1999:75). Capabilities 
in his view are viewed as freedom, i.e. the freedom to achieve alternative functioning 
combinations. He sees poverty as more than low income and instead as the deprivation 
of basic and fundamentally important capabilities. Examples can be the capability of 
being employed in order to earn income and the capability to survive.  These 
capabilities can in many cases be deprived beyond people’s control and can be greatly 
affected by characteristics such as gender and race. The gender inequality approach 
often emphasizes that woman in many parts of the world lack support for central 
functions in their life (Nussebaum, 2000:1). This includes lower enrolment in school, 
higher levels of illiteracy, poorer health conditions and higher vulnerability to sexual 
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abuse. Gender inequality is most obvious and persistent in poor societies where there 
is a strong antifemale bias (Sen, 1999:194). Much of the reason for the antifemale bias 
can be the result of women’s social standing and their economic power. The capability 
approach emphasizes that women and men have different social and political 
circumstances that result in unequal human capabilities. Relative deprivations in 
women’s well-being are still present and there is a need to understand the treatment of 
women as less equal than men and perhaps some of their culturally neglected needs. 
As briefly discussed above, traditional development thinking has focused more on the 
well-being or rather the ill-being and needs for women (Sen, 1999:191). Of particular 
importance in Sen’s argument is the attention paid to gender inequality and moving 
away from income statics to some of the ‘real’ worries in the areas such as the Sub-
Saharan region by considering for instance the demographic and social information.  
Though the evidence show that women can suffer in number of different ways than 
men because of deprived capabilities, the debates have shifted more towards people’s 
agency role, as briefly mentioned in the introduction. This does not mean that 
women’s suffering in terms of sexual violence, leading to unwanted pregnancy and/or 
HIV/AIDS, should not be a concern on the agenda. Rather, for the future development 
debate on the status of women should be focused on their agency to deal with the root 
causes to deprivation and inequalities that depress women’s well-being vis-à-vis 
men’s.  
 
In terms of the gender inequality debate a discourse named the gender-and-
development (GAD) started as a reaction to the women-in-development (WID) debate, 
where gender were to represent both men and women and emphasize the agency role 
of women instead of their vulnerability. Thus the victimization of women in 
developing countries was criticized and the GAD discourse has in turn shaped the 
views of the development debate and donor community in important ways. However, 
many argue that the representations of African women in particular are still 
represented as overworked and victims of a patriarchic system (Arnfred, 2004:12). 
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One example is from OCHA2/IRIN (2005:217), who states that women and girls are 
preconditioned for exploitation in a context that denies them some of the basic human 
rights in the patriarchic society. According to Arnfred (ibid), this contextual 
framework mainstreams the debate into thinking of African women as universally 
subordinated under a primordial patriarchy. In the tradition/modernity discourse, GAD 
inspired thinking is linked to African culture as detrimental for women and that gender 
equality and modernity is in opposition to this culture.  
 
The human rights approach, which will be further developed in the analysis, is based 
on the United Nations (UN) Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) from 
1948. This declaration is formally adopted by all member countries of the UN and 
proclaims all individuals the right to live in dignity and realize their own development 
goals, regardless of their characteristics such as sex or ethnicity. Since the last two 
decades of the 20th Century, the development debate shifted increasingly from a 
growth-centered model to enhancing people’s capabilities and thus fitting well into 
Sen’s capability approach. Many of the supporters for a human rights-based approach 
support the function of the state as the main responsible for securing and protecting 
such rights and responsibilities for its citizens (Marks & Andreassen, 2006:vii). The 
rights and responsibilities in the human rights-based approach in the broad sense 
relates directly to international standards in law, political and economic dimensions. 
The ‘international community’, meaning the multilateral agencies in human rights and 
development agencies as well as financial institutions, should in turn contribute in a 
necessary extent to set the mechanisms and principles for the human rights approach.    
2.4 Limitations of the framework  
There are many limitations on all of these theoretical approaches, but this thesis will 
only include those aspects that are most central related to the analysis. The culturalist 
perspective, though useful in the analysis, can appear like the Western states 
developed in a more controlled and organic manner, while the African states are 
artificially made with severe failures paralleled by violence. However, it is important 
                                               
2
 OCHA is under the United Nations and responsible of coordinating humanitarian relief from various INGO’s 
and NGO’s.  
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to note that the Western development of a state was a result of both conquest and 
violence. Assuming that the African states should suddenly enter the ‘ideal state’ 
situation largely ignores the history of violence in Western Europe. Further, 
understanding traditional African societies as groupings of social order, rather than 
states, where group identity is the primary source of security and moral values, can 
explain why inter-group conflict result in levels of violence and abuse that would not 
be tolerated within the group. Gender perspectives have the advantages of critically 
approach the fundamental relations between gender and power. However, gender 
approaches have in many cases failed to incorporate gender-balanced understanding of 
violence and power. Gender has often been used to discuss so-called ‘women issues’ 
or women in particular, thus failing to see the dynamics and interrelations between 
men and women. On the one hand, it can make men hesitant to embrace a gender 
dialogue and, on the other hand, it can annoy some women when men do get involved 
(Mechanic, 2004:13). Further, gender debates have mostly originated outside the 
social science and are perhaps more a social movement (Randall, 2002:109). When the 
debates have been included in the social science, it has been selective and partial from 
the gender debates outside academia. The gender debates lack a coherent discussion 
and perspectives can sometimes be conflicting. A classical and highly disputed 
example of this is Susan Brownmiller’s (1975) essentialist approach. The labelling of 
women and men in a dichotomous category of victim and perpetrator respectively, 
have caused criticism by the constructivist gender perspectives. Overall, discussion 
about gender in the academic field should be seen as a developing discourse under a 
common but evolving agenda.  
 
Development theories and approaches have mainly been developed in the Western 
world, dominated by American and European and some Latin-American schools of 
thought. Thus, the actual usefulness of these theories in the African region is 
contested. Analysis on the state and institution building based on Western experiences 
is a clear example of this. Clearly, culture matters and it is important as a researcher to 
avoid as much as possible to look through ethnocentric glasses when analyzing other 
cultures. In order to understand some of the local motivations for committing sexual 
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violence, cultural differences and local opinions will be taken into account through the 
fieldwork in the DRC. When it comes to the capability approach, it is more a 
framework of thought than a development model, since it does not provide any 
formulas for development but instead attention to evaluate the development process 
(Tungodden, 2001:8). The ‘all-encompassing’ approach can be too vague to actually 
provide any usefulness in development analysis. This is also the challenge for the 
human rights approach of applying broad concepts of human rights into development 
tools. The right to development does not translate itself into actual components of 
development in a society. Thus the main challenge is to convert this approach into an 
operational model used in development efforts.  
 
2.5 Methodological concerns  
2.5.1 Case studies and comparative research 
Case analysis will be the main methodological focus in chapter 4.0 when discussing 
how the use of sexual violence can be explained in various levels. In the second part of 
the analysis, chapter 5.0, comparative case analysis is used to discuss the approaches 
and challenges for two countries. The choice of two methods is related to the research 
questions where the focus of the first question is the DRC, while the other questions 
discuss the usefulness and the challenges of approaches to deal with sexual violence in 
Liberia and the DRC. These two cases can be compared in terms of the widespread use 
of sexual violence during conflict and can both be seen as fragile post-conflict states. 
From the reports and statics found on the extent of sexual violence in the DRC and 
Liberia, both can appear to be extreme cases. Comparative research in the African 
continent on sexual violence in war remains scarce. But at the same time the evidence 
point at many similar cases for conflict prone areas in the Sub-Saharan region and 
there are useful lessons to be learnt from comparative research in addressing these 
issues. Comparative analysis can be useful in finding different results of international 
efforts depending on national actors’ commitments and the coordination between 
international, national and local levels. Hopefully, the lessons learned can be more 
effective use of available means so that human suffering is reduced and countries can 
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return to peace. The comparative method is chosen in order to analyse the situation in 
the DRC in a broader perspective. The reason why Liberia is interesting is because 
they have specifically addressed gender-based violence at the state-level. The 
comparison will be based on the theoretical approaches and the empirical date to see if 
the international efforts and the state-level legislation have any implications for 
reducing the motivations for committing acts of sexual violence at the more local 
level.  
 
I have chosen an inductive explorative methodology that is not controlled by firmly 
established theories (Andersen, 2003:102). Chabal & Daloz (2006:41-46) criticize the 
process of seeking explanations of cultural complexity through a grand theory that will 
go on the expense of insight and a better approach is to thus in the culturalist 
perspective to understand what makes sense within the given context. They argue that 
the Western theories of politics are often far away from the empirical realities found in 
settings far away from where there the theories are derived. Further, this thesis will not 
discuss possible new theories about sexual violence in this research. Instead, the 
existing approaches will be used as a tool to discuss probable causes to sexual violence 
in the given context and how it might be reduced. Further, what is used in this thesis is 
a behavioural approach to the analysis (Sanders, 2002:45). The central question is 
then: why do people behave in the way they do? The behaviour in question here is 
sexual violence, which is an observable behaviour and is also the dependent variable. 
The independent variables are the processes leading up to the dependent variable. 
These explanations for behaviour are susceptible to empirical testing. The main 
independent variable will be the perpetrators motivations for committing sexual 
violence based on their context. The context will be discussed using the theoretical 
framework of the development and gender analysis. The operationalization of 
motivation for using sexual violence in war will be considered at the personal level, 
the group level and the national level. These levels are certainly interrelated and are 
both dynamic and changing but will be separated in order to develop a level of 
analysis. Because of the lack of strong theories, it is essential to have this three level 
structure to analyze the subject systematically. I will also argue that power relation 
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between the levels and the inequality that exists are significant to understand 
motivations at the various levels. In the second analysis, the international, national and 
local level will be used as the analytical framework to discuss the approaches for 
dealing with sexual violence in Liberia and the DRC.    
 
Motivations for sexual violence can be operationalized in a rational choice model of 
three components: Individual benefits, collective benefits, and individual costs 
(Sanders, 2002:57). However, this simple approach is neither very appropriate nor 
very useful. Motivations for certain behaviours can often both be rational and non-
rational at the same time, depending on the interpretation. Western scholars who study 
non-Western societies are often faced with attitudes and behaviour that appears 
irrational to them (Chabal & Daloz, 2006:50). E.g. using sexual violence towards 
civilians can be seen as fully legitimate by the perpetrators and conceived as 
acceptable by several state-level actors, but fully illegitimate by advocates of human 
rights and international law. Chabal & Daloz (2006:75) state that rationality is 
culturally contextual and the approach used is thus to modify the rational choice model 
to suit better the ‘cultural logic’ so to speak for motivations to behaviour. More 
specifically, the motivations will be analysed through the socio-economic development 
and the status and relation between men and women. The contextual approaches are 
seen as indicators, where for instance gender inequality and the lack of basic 
livelihoods are two such indicators. However, the methodological concerns are indeed 
vast with such a highly stigmatized and tabooed subject as sexual violence. Some 
indicators on the socio-economic and gender level cannot mechanically condition the 
perpetrators’ motivations. As Chabal & Daloz (2006:69) argue, the same conditions 
may foster different attitudes towards a final outcome. Getting reliable information 
about motivations will be a challenge, especially by persons directly involved. Further, 
there is the question of causality in analyzing the use of sexual violence in war. When 
we know for sure that rape and other forms of violence does not end with a better 
socio-economic development, how can we say anything certain about causality in less 
developed societies? There are also concerns related to the lack of sufficient research 
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and documentation of sexual violence in the DRC in terms of motivations, which will 
be further discussed under the chapter on challenges.  
2.5.2 Fieldwork in the DRC 
The fieldwork in Kinshasa, Goma (capital in North Kivu) and Bukavu (capital in 
South Kivu) in the DRC lasted for approximately two weeks during March/April 2008 
and constitutes of qualitative research. The data from this field research is not intended 
to be generalized to other cases, but is a supplement in the study of sexual violence. 
Following the culturalist approach, it was central to acquire a contextual understanding 
of the situation on the ground. However, it was neither possible to travel directly into 
the conflict field nor interview soldiers or war lords directly involved with sexual 
violence. This would have put many people in danger including myself. Sexual 
violence is a highly sensitive issue for soldiers as these are crimes and ‘immoral acts’.  
 
Central during this rather brief stay was to have some local allies who were trusted by 
the local population. The religious network in Bukavu through the Norwegian Church 
Aid and the Norwegian Pentecost Missionaries were of tremendous help here and 
being seen as a part of the Christian network was important to be able to discuss 
sensitive issues. From former fieldwork on the issue of sexual violence, many 
researchers have emphasized the need to guarantee full anonymity, especially towards 
soldiers and violated women, to secure confidentiality. However, the victims and 
former child soldiers gladly told me their names and wanted their story to be told. I 
have intentionally only included their first name in this thesis. One of the problems I 
encountered was that I got the sense that the victims did not tell the whole truth in 
terms of who the violators were, which was also confirmed by those who were 
working with them. The female victims always blamed the Interhamwe as 
perpetrators, which will be returned to in the analysis, even though they came from 
areas in the South Kivu were it was most likely other rebel groups or the national army 
had operated. The Interhamwe have become a sort of scapegoat among the civilians 
and also represent a group that can easily be understood and accepted in the public as 
violators. The former child soldiers also reported that their participation was only as 
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slaves in the camps and not as soldiers, though there were several reasons to doubt 
their indications. Though these former child soldiers were clearly victims of war, they 
hesitated to discuss some of their actions in these groups. Another major 
methodological problem encountered was the issue of language. The informants spoke 
only their native language and perhaps Swahili, which not only meant that information 
was lost in translation, but also that I was seen even more as an outsider and could not 
expect the whole truth from my informants. One thing I particularly regret is telling 
the former child soldiers that I was studying sexual violence, as it might have revealed 
more information to deemphasize this matter. At the same time, however, it might 
have been an unethical method if the child soldiers were mislead to reveal something 
they would not have done in another context. The most useful lesson from the 
fieldwork was to witness both the administrational and policy centred capital 
Kinshasa, far away from the war-thorn east, compared to the more emergency and 
development projects in Goma and Bukavu. This disparity revealed the challenge 
between a weak state centred far away from conflict at the more rural and local level. 
Another advantage was to travel to the field rather late in terms of the writing process, 
as the experience would have been overwhelming if I was not prepared for the 
depressing situation for these victims and the overall socio-economic situation.  
 
2.5.3 Some challenges 
Getting reliable information about sexual violence is difficult enough in itself in 
‘normal’ situations compared to a conflict situation. First, sexual violence makes the 
victim often stigmatized and hence something he or she might want to avoid 
discussing. Second, perpetrators motives can be conflicting between the militias 
overall ideological motives (if they exist) and individual soldiers’ actions in conflict 
situations. Thirdly, analysis of gender and violence can come from biased sources and 
rarely from either victims or perpetrators. Empirical research on sexual violence in 
many cases is based on non-governmental organizations’ (NGO) work and they 
represent efforts to collect more funding and putting sexual violence at the 
international agenda. Even though their work in the DRC often provides a relief and 
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much needed aid for the civilians, it also might represent several methodological 
concerns in terms of reliable conclusions from data. The literature often frames sexual 
violence as a weapon of war often without revealing more specifically how and why it 
has been used. This of course varies and many reports, especially by the Human Rights 
Watch (2007a & 2007b), clarify the situation. Overall, however, the ‘NGO language’ 
to state it simply, frames the debate with sexual violence as a weapon in war and focus 
on the subordinate status of women in the DRC and other countries in the Sub-Saharan 
region. Though this is part of the picture, they fail to nuance the picture and see the 
cultural complexity to understand why it is happening. Furthermore, figures 
represented by NGO’s like Doctors Without Borders (MSF) tend to only represent 
those victims who actively seek medical help at the hospitals. Other figures are based 
on estimates from talking to locals, so-called ‘neighbourhood method’ of inquiry, thus 
paving the way for possible rumours.  
 
The Human Security Report (2005:8) discusses several problems with the data on 
sexual violence in countries at war. One methodological concern is that one cannot be 
sure if increased incidents of rape are a function of increased reporting, increased 
violence or both. Another concern is the lack of reliable cross-national data on rape. 
However, one reliable finding is that the displacement of women is highly associated 
with the likelihood of becoming a victim of sexual violence, according to The Human 
Security Report 2005. One of the apparent methodological concerns is that there seems 
to be a great confusion of statistical numbers in the NGO data and the literature. There 
is no complete data at the national level of victims and perpetrators and the research is 
rather ad hoc and centred around certain areas of the DRC. Further, the data used is 
often replicated with added new statistics, thus running the risk of representing higher 
numbers than the actual status. Because of increased focus on sexual violence by the 
UN and NGO’s, old rape cases are being reported leaving the development of sexual 
violence in the DRC unreliable. One example of confusion of data is the UN report by 
the Human Rights Council (Ertürk, 2008:6) where its first state that the majority of 
perpetrators of sexual violence in 2007 were the state security forces with 97% of 
reported cases. On the next section the report (Ertürk, 2008:7) states that 70 % of all 
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rape cases were committed by non-state groups, without even commenting on the 
disparity between the numbers. The same type of confusion of numbers is found in the 
Rwandan case, which has implications for the DRC since the wars are closely related. 
One example from Rwanda is in Turshen & Twagiramariya (1998:100) were they 
simple state that “20% of the male population died, leaving 60% of women widowed; 
70 % of Rwanda’s population is now female”. These are obvious percentage errors 
that leaves number of refugees into the DRC as well as rape cases in Rwanda up for 
re-evaluation. In sum, the data from the NGO’s as well as from the media should 
always be taken with caution and it represents a concern to what extent sexual violence 
really is endemic in the DRC. However, these statistical challenges is important to 
emphasize but less relevant to the analysis in this thesis.  
 
One important methodological concern is that the case of the DRC is more thoroughly 
analyzed through fieldwork, while Liberia is solely based on secondary literature as 
well as other researchers’ recent fieldwork findings in post-war Liberia. Thus, the 
comparativeness is based on certain selected areas closely connected to the challenges 
faced in the DRC that are also found in Liberia. The literature used in the case of 
Liberia lacks the voices from the more marginalized sections of the society due to 
neglect of these voices in the available literature. Thus, this analysis is limited to some 
general trends mostly at the international and national level in the case of Liberia, thus 
reducing the comparativeness at the more local level.  
 29 
PART II: The causes of sexual violence in war 
3.0 Background and context of the war in DR Congo 
Getting an overview of the war in DRC from approximately 1996 to 1997 and the 
second war from 1998 to 2003 is indeed a difficult task. The analysis will be based on 
the war from 1998 to 2003 that is called the second Congo War and also Africa’s First 
Wold War. The main focus will be on the boarder areas around Ituri in the North on 
the boarder with Uganda and the North and South Kivu, on the border with Rwanda 
and Burundi. But first, a brief overview of the modern history of the DRC is needed to 
understand the context of Africa’s First World War.  
 
The DRC is known for its abundance of natural resources, from rubber trees to 
diamonds to copper. The country covers an area at the same size as Western Europe 
and is landlocked in central Africa except for a small sea port between Angola and 
Cameroon. The DRC’s geographical conditions create prosperous potentials as well as 
huge challenges. The political and economic history of the country from colonization 
until today has in many ways proved to be kleptocratic under what many will conceive 
as brutal leaderships. King Leopold II of Belgium announced in 1885 that the Congo 
Free State region was his to rule and the following twenty years was one of histories 
worst colonial experiences in terms of slavery and exploitation of resources for export 
(Milios, 2005:22). Findings from this period state that at least one million and up to 
twelve million Congolese slaves died from maltreatment and starvation and that most 
of the profits from exports were kept in King Leopold’s hands. Years of dependence to 
Belgium followed when Leopold gave away his power after huge international 
pressure. In 1960, the Congo finally gained its independence from Belgium after years 
of struggle and protests. General Joseph-Désiré Mobutu took control as the country’s 
new president in a military coup in 1965, and re-named the country to Zaire. In more 
than three decades, Mobutu privatized the state to enrich himself, his relatives and his 
clients (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002:141). The Mobutu dictatorship is a clear example of 
African politics in the neo-patrimonial system. Though it left the country with a weak 
 30 
socio-economic development and a weak state, little violence and ethnic conflict took 
place during the Zairen-period.  
 
The end of the Cold War dramatically changed the geopolitical context of Mobutu’s 
Zaire. It meant the end of American support to the dictatorship and the collapse of the 
Soviet bloc resulted in readily available small arms in the region (Bøås & Dunn, 
2007:18). Insurgency groups emerged and took control over mineral-rich areas in the 
eastern Congo. The technological advancement in communication in the 1990’s with 
satellite and cellular phones and the Internet increased the insurgent groups’ 
communication with each other and central leaders, and with the Congolese diaspora. 
This resulted in better coordination and increased external support for their operations 
against the central authority. This represents the modernity of African societies as 
discussed above. According to Bøås & Dunn (ibid) this was a tactic used by the DRC’s 
upcoming president Laurent Kabila and his rebels to assault Mobutu and his shrinking 
force. When Kabila seized control over the country, he renamed the state to the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, despite the fact that it was not democratic and 
hardly a republic in the traditional use of the concept. Kabila’s rule soon proved that 
he was more interested in enriching himself from the country’s wealth with a few 
others rather than sharing power.  
 
Some claim that the most devastating factor in the war was the spill-over effect from 
the 1994 Rwanda genocide, which lead to a massive Hutu refugee flight into the Kivus 
(Milios, 2005:27). The Hutu rebels that fled to what was then Zaire set up military 
bases to continue the fighting against the Rwandan Tutsi-dominated army. These 
genocidaires relocated to Congolese soil and were able to regroup in their efforts to 
reconquer the Rwandan state and finish their genocide (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002:224). 
They used the refugee camps in the Kivus for this purpose but also to massacre Tutsi 
and Congolese citizens. Here, some of the worst attacks in the DRC are aimed at the 
civilian Tutsis in the North- and South-Kivu. Kabila soon lost the support he ones 
enjoyed from the Rwanda government, after his army had allegedly killed thousands 
of Congolese Tutsis, and a new rebel group developed in the East. Rwanda, Uganda, 
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and Burundi supported the rebels attack on the Kabila government, while neighbouring 
Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia supported Kabila’s army.  
 
The war has been labelled tribal or ethnic by the meagre news coverage, but the more 
correct term would be an interstate war when it has involved so many countries, both 
directly and indirectly. Further, the Congolese rebels that choose to be guided by 
Rwanda and Uganda had little in common except opposition to president Kabila. 
There exists hardly any evidence of a common ideology or a societal project for these 
various groups. Some were Tutsi allies who were close to the Rwandan regime and 
some were intellectuals dreaming of revolutionary change and others were former 
Mobutu delegates seeking to return to power. On the other hand, Kabila neither had 
any coherent political vision of the DRC. Economic interests were of course of major 
importance, both to the foreign aggressors as well as the first Kabila government. For 
instance, Mugabe’s intervention to protect the government in Kinshasa was above all 
that he was given control over a state mining company named Gecamines; one of the 
most income generating mineral veins in central Africa that he wanted to protect 
(Thornycroft, 2007-07-25).  
 
Laurent Kabila was shot dead the 16th of January 2001 and was immediately replaced 
by his son Joseph Kabila, who was a former guerrilla fighter. Despite a shady 
background and his kinship, he is widely credited for leading the war to an end in 
2003. In the first democratic election in the DRC, supported by UN mission in the 
DRC (MONUC), Kabila officially won the role as president. Despite several peace 
agreements, like the one reached in Goma in the North Kivu in January 2008, the 
fighting continues and wounds are not in any circumstances healed. But a fragile peace 
has emerged also in the two Kivus and the Ituri region.  
 
All parties in the second war in the DRC are claimed to have used sexual violence, 
including the peacekeeping forces in the UN mission in the DRC (MONUC), the 
Congolese national army (FARDC) and the police (PNC). This analysis will mostly 
focus on the FARDC as well as some of the main warring groups. The groups that will 
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be discussed is the Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Rwanda (FDLR) 
consisting of former genocidaires, Hutu refugees and Congolese Hutu recruits and the 
Mayi Mayi’s who are community-based fighters that initially defended local territories 
against foreign invasions. The Interhamwe, mostly consisting of Rwandan soldiers and 
a militia primarily responsible for structuring the genocide, are central actors in the 
Kivu’s and will also be discussed. However, the international observers and Congolese 
often use the label Interhamwe consisting on a mixture of refugees, former rebels and 
their families as well as Rwandan political opponents forced to flee.  
 
The terms ‘hate rape’ and ‘lust rape’ will be used to categorize some of the sexual 
violence in the DRC. ‘Lust rape’ is here understood as the perceived and socially 
constructed ideas about men’s sexual needs that make them commit sexually violent 
acts against civilians. ‘Hate rape’, on the other hand, is not about men’s sexuality but 
rather understood as a brutal aggression resembling murder. ‘Lust rape’ is traditionally 
in the DRC a rape of a girl by a male ‘admirer’, though this concept has changed in the 
war situation as will be further explained below. ‘Hate rape’ is used more as a weapon 
of war to subdue, humiliate and punish local populations. Though the distinctions of 
these terms are often blurry, they are useful concepts in the way that sexual violence is 
not always a weapon of war and systematic in the way often represented in the media 
and the advocacy literature.  
 
4.0 Analysis 
Motivations in the development and gender context 
The rational use of sexual violence often has a strategic face that has several 
motivations mutually reinforcing each other. To structure combatants’ motivation for 
committing sexual violence, I have chosen to structure it at the three levels mentioned 
above, the national level in relation to foreign influence, the group level, and the 
individual level. These levels will of course interact and it is important to see the 
dynamics at work. The context for the combatants also matter greatly for motivations 
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and also the types of violence in the socio-economic environment. Portraying 
perpetrators as ‘sick’ or ‘abnormal’ is clearly not sufficient as sexual aggression is 
more likely linked to social and environmental variables.   
 
4.1. Individual level – the spoils of war?  
First, in order to get a socio-economic understanding at the individual level, we need 
to look at the way women can be seen as ‘properties’ belonging to the family or 
husband. In other words; the individual level of victims. According to the analysis 
done by International Alert (2005:45), sexual violence during the war in the DRC was 
clearly linked with unequal gender relations and the way many conceived women’s 
bodies as objects. There is a strong antifemale bias in the sense that women are treated 
as less than equal in relation to their male counterparts. Several ethnic groups in South 
Kivu practice subservience of women that reduces them to private property. 
Traditional customs that practice levirate, i.e. the brother-in-law inherits the widow, 
are still far from dying out, according to the International Alert (2005:27). In some 
ethnic groups, like the Banyamulenge in South Kivu, women are seen as common 
property of the clan, where the father-in-law or the brother-in-law has the right to have 
sexual relations with the married woman. This, however, is a form of economic 
commitment to secure the property of the late husband’s resources, but usually viewed 
in Western perceptions as gender inequality and even rape. As in most other cultures, 
domestic violence including sexual violence has taken place in the DRC before the 
war broke out, but how widespread it was is uncertain. The war has the effect of 
exacerbating such views of unequal power relations because of the insecure situations 
that makes women even more vulnerable to such attacks.   
 
Further, we need to look at the socio-economic context of the individual perpetrators, 
in most cases found to be men. In a fieldwork in South Kivu, the researchers found 
that armies and militias often compromise young men with little or no education and 
are often illiterate (International Alert, 2005:46). This was an observation confirmed in 
another fieldwork where Thakur (2008:11) in addition found that the individual 
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combatants receive far less economic remuneration than their leaders, which in turn 
opens up for personal exploitation of the local populations. Some of the soldiers were 
forced into the militias while others were voluntaries in a socio-economic context of 
extreme poverty and lack of alternative economic income. For these men, the gun 
becomes a source of income, as well as increased power and social standing. Women 
and girls could be seen by perpetrators as sexual commodities to be conquered, not 
individual people with their own rights (OCHA/IRIN, 2005:217). The combatants’ 
motivations were argued to be of physiological nature and their need to satisfy sexual 
urges, according to soldiers and women interviewed. At the individual level, the sexual 
abuse could be seen by perpetrators as a ‘recreational’ activity – a bonus – that gave 
them both adventure and power over the victims. In Enloe’s studies (2000:117) 
‘recreational rape’ is argued by military officials to happen when soldiers are not 
sufficiently supplied with sexual partners. This type of sexual violence or services is 
often linked to prostitution. However, in the eastern DRC women and girls are kept as 
personal slaves for sexual services without payment as these soldiers are argued to be 
too poor to pay prostitutes (Wood, forthcoming). The soldiers are often separated from 
their families in Uganda, Burundi or Rwanda and need to find other ways to be 
satisfied. Not only are the women and girls unpaid but according to International Alert 
(2005:46) they are also used to secure the combatants day-to-day survival. The 
combatants often do not get paid or if they do it is irregular, except from the Rwandan 
Patriotic Army (RPA). Many soldiers hence live off the local population as a coping 
strategy. Many women have been abducted and kept as slaves to provide sexual, 
domestic and agricultural services. Sexual violence is thus not only either ‘lust’ or 
‘hate’ but also represents an ‘economic rape’. In the discussion of the political 
economy of sexual violence, Turshen (2001:55) argues that this violence is a strategy 
used by men to extract personal assets from women. Women’s assets are their 
productive and reproductive power and in turn their possessions and access to 
important livelihoods as land. In the guerrilla warfare in the DRC, rebels live off the 
land and women holds the productivity of the agricultural assets. Thus, one factor 
contributing to sexual violence is the socio-economic context where women are both 
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seen as ‘objects’ as well as providers of economic assets that the rebels need for 
survival.  
 
This type of violence, however, is not sufficient in explaining the extreme violence 
witnessed by many observers in the east. Baaz and Stern (2008:58) interviewed several 
soldiers with recent experiences in the Kivus and Ituri to encounter their motivations, 
justifications and explanations for violence that are perceived by the Western media as 
‘barbaric violence’. The soldiers in the survey were mostly FARDC soldiers and were 
interviewed in a semi-structured qualitative group discussion. These soldiers 
experiences are not indented to be generalized to all soldiers in the conflict prone 
areas, but the study represent a rare insight into the minds of soldiers in the DRC that 
are often not taken into account, neither by Western researchers nor in the DRC. In the 
DRC, policemen and soldiers are often referred to as ‘thieves’ (miyibi), which 
represent a deep dissatisfaction among the public towards the security apparatus. Baaz 
& Stern (2008:75-76) found that many of the soldiers’ motivation for committing 
severe human rights violations, like sexual violence, were explained indirectly as a 
livelihood strategy and an expression of suffering and frustration in relation to neglect 
and poverty. To understand this view we need to take some steps back and see what 
the soldiers interviewed thought of as ‘an ideal soldier’ in relation to their actual 
situation. According to the majority of the soldiers interviewed, the ideal type of 
soldiers was those who followed orders and were disciplined according to the military 
codes. Instead of a ‘macho’ culture of the military, the soldiers emphasized dignity, 
respect and humility as ‘a good soldier’. The Règlement Militaire (RM) in the DRC 
states that rape is not allowed and that if the soldiers have sexual needs, they should 
masturbate (Male sub-lieutenant, age 25 in Baaz & Stern, 2008:75). Taking other 
people’s women is thus not accepted through the RM and was also confirmed by the 
majority of the soldiers interviewed as inappropriate behaviour in their perception of a 
good soldier.  
 
However, there was a great sense of dissatisfaction and frustration towards the leaders 
and superiors among the soldiers. The Congolese soldiers are among the poorest 
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section of the society were a theoretical monthly salary of $10-20 is rarely paid. This 
salary has increased to $40 the last two years, but is still a low income. In addition, the 
mortality rate among soldiers’ children remains high and school enrolment is 
practically zero. Order and discipline towards the military leaders was hard to follow 
when they neglected the soldiers and their families’ basic rights like salary, medical 
and funereal expenses etc. When Baaz & Stern (2008:77) asked the soldiers about 
sexual violence towards civilians, the soldiers rationalized this behaviour as an indirect 
result of poverty and neglect. Poverty and neglect lead to such violence because they 
felt the need to violate the RM in order to make ends meet, but also the resulted 
feelings of frustration and anger. Two male corporals in one of the discussion groups 
connected poverty and anger as the main source of committing rape. They also 
justified their behaviour as being out of control in their actions and thus they felt not 
accountable for these acts. Following is a sequence of their conversation from Baaz & 
Stern’s studies (2008:77):  
 
Male corporal A: Yes, it is anger [kanda], it is creating, the suffering [pasi] is creating… You feel 
you have to do something bad, you mix it all: sabotage, women, stealing, rip the clothes off, killing. 
Male corporal B: You have sex and then you kill her, if the anger is too strong [soki kanda eleki, 
obomi ye]. 
Male corporal A: It is suffering [pasi] which makes us rape. Suffering. If I wake up in the morning 
and I am fine, I have something to eat, my wife loves me [mwasi alingaka ngai], will I then do things 
like that? No. But now, today we are hungry, yesterday I was hungry, tomorrow I will be hungry. 
They, the leaders/superiors [bamikonzi] are cheating us. We don’t have anything. 
 
Notable in this conversation is that the male corporal A mixes the public sphere as a 
soldier with his role as a private civilian man at the household level. The element “my 
wife does not love me” was repeatedly found in the majority of the conversations 
about rape and other forms of sexual violence in Baaz & Stern’s (2008) study. Central 
was that the male soldiers felt that this lack of love was caused by their poverty 
condition and they could not fulfil their role in the family as the head and the provider 
of their family’s basic needs. Further, the male soldiers expressed a fear and suspicion 
towards their wives that they would find other men that could make ends meet. The 
women were depicted by these men as unreliable and opportunistic if the women see 
better opportunities presented. Several cases from the Ituri and the Kivus have shown 
that girls and women turn to so-called ‘survival sex’, where they trade the use of their 
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bodies to soldiers who could provide them with some food or temporary shelter. The 
fear is that the situation of survival sex makes more abusive forms of sexual relations 
more common. The soldiers interviewed mixed these gender discourses about their 
women as being unreliable and opportunistic with a rationalization of their violent 
behaviour towards other women.  
4.1.1 Rebel without a cause?    
One of Weinstein’s (2007:7-12) intriguing findings is that rebel groups that operate in 
areas of vast natural resources are more likely to employ high level of indiscriminate 
violence. Rebel soldiers who have a low-commitment to the group are by Weinstein 
seen as consumers who seek short-term benefits from their involvement, opposite to 
high-commitment individuals seen as investors. The consumer soldiers are termed 
opportunistic rebellions where participation is somehow with lower risks and with 
expectation of immediate rewards. This, according to Weinstein (ibid), can be 
detrimental to the local population where the lack of social and political ties resulting 
in short-term orientation implies soldiers’ motivation to loot, destroy property and 
assault civilians indiscriminately. These approaches by rebels will in Weinstein’s 
perception increase resistance among civilians as well as retribution by other armed 
groups, which elapse into a spiral of violence. What is increasingly witnessed in the 
eastern DRC is the tendency of warring groups to outbid each other on extreme 
violence. Even though it might seem perplexing, rebels can initially be motivated by 
joining arms as a mean of day to day survival where civilian targets are their main 
strategy for endurance.  
 
Further, many of the combatants in the rebel groups lack sufficient training and 
discipline from the top level and are often sent into the forest far away from any 
authorities (International Alert, 2005:46). In an area called Shabunda in the South 
Kivu, young militia recruits are taken into a ritual of drug-taking and violence to 
strengthen their character. This usually implies killing a family member, often their 
father or mother. The combatants display a particularly predatory behaviour in the 
areas in which they operate.  This was a finding further explained in Baaz & Stern’s 
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(2008:78-79) studies were the so-called ‘craziness of war’ mixed with widespread 
drug-taking by the soldiers resulted in sexual violence as an outlet for the unnatural 
mental state of war. The soldiers interviewed by Baaz & Stern divided between normal 
and deviant behaviour of soldiers and explained how the war had made deviant 
behaviour normal. The psychological trauma for the soldiers was found to affect 
soldiers in diverse situation that lead to violence beyond the ‘normal’ character of the 
soldiers.  
 
At the individual level, researchers can divide between so-called ‘lust rape’ and ‘hate 
rape’, according to Baaz3. Some of male soldiers in the FARDC whom Baaz 
interviewed rationalized their behaviour as being motivated by a sense of lust rather 
than hate. The idea of lust rape is related to men’s sexuality and their sexual needs. 
The ideas about men’s sexuality compared to women are perhaps a mixture of biology 
and socially constructed ideas about their needs and desires. In the FARDC, sexual 
violence is not found to be a military strategy, but there is a degree of acceptance 
among the soldiers and their commanders for ‘lust rape’ despite the RM, according to 
Baaz (ibid footnote). Arnfred (2004:17) argues that the Christianity and colonization 
have changed the moral views on sexuality for men and women in Africa. Sexuality 
for women is closely linked to existence and procreation and the pleasure and lust is 
closely tied to sin. Though the cornerstone in Christianity in general represents this 
perspective, the reality is that it works differently for men in Arnfred’s view. Pleasure 
and multiple partners is something that continues to exist for men and are even 
naturalized as a part of the male nature. This double standard in the male/female 
sexuality is something that continues to exist along with female chastity and their 
sexuality under male control, according to Arnfred. On the other hand, however, 
women in this part of Africa also have other partners than their husband. This can be a 
part of women’s need for economic income and is often labelled ‘survival sex’. 
Further, when the soldiers in the Baaz & Stern’s (2008) study depicted women as 
opportunistic, they might have referred to exactly this aspect when they felt that they 
could not provide for the family’s basic needs and hence the woman had to seek other 
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economic incomes. With the lack of alternatives in the development context, the 
women might turn to ‘survival sex’, which further creates feeling of frustration and 
anger among the husbands and the feeling of ‘failed masculinity’ that needs to be 
compensated.  
 
4.2 The group level - sexual violence as a weapon?   
Rape as a weapon of war is usually associated with official encouragement from 
military leaders or politicians (Human Security Report, 2005:109). The most clear 
example for this was the Serbian military leaders’ so-called Ram-plan where they 
encourage targeting the Muslim women in their genocidal plan of a Muslim retreat 
(Allan, 1996:57). Through rape and forced impregnation the logic of the policy was to 
erase all identity characteristics of the woman other than as a sexual container. Further, 
sexual violence as a weapon of war is often associated with identity politics, like in 
genocide or ownership rights. These violent acts often involve publically displaying 
rapes in the local society with the double effect of maximizing humiliation for the 
victim and to spread fear among the population. The humiliation of the victim and 
his/her family can destroy the social network that the victim and the family ones 
enjoyed. Thus the warring group has successfully managed to destroy the life of their 
perceived enemies and made future reconciliation more difficult. The fear component 
uses the victim’s body as a mean to restrain resistance towards the warring group by 
sending out an unpleasant danger signal.  
 
In many war situations are the erosion of norms that in times of peace serve to restrain 
anti-social behaviour. The group level is associated with larger attacks on civilians and 
communities. The brutal acts of sexual violence have allegedly been motivated by the 
armed groups such as the FDLR to inflict terror to demonstrate control or punishing 
the civilians for supposedly sympathizing with enemy groups (see e.g. Human Rights 
Watch, 2007a:25). But as was discussed at the individual level of sexual violence, it 
has become more than a social violence, to humiliate and cause trauma, but represents 
an economic violence because of women’s productive and reproductive capacity. As 
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the Congolese women are the major provider of agricultural products, soldiers use 
sexual violence as a mean to access these products. Rape and other forms of violence 
is thus a form of weapon to survival in this perspective. However, sexual violence and 
in particular rape has perhaps the by-product of gratification for the perpetrators, but 
are possibly better explained as an expression of power and control over their victims. 
Sexual violence becomes weapons of domination and repression that in the long-run 
has the goal of breaking women’s resistance and demoralize the men. Rape as a 
weapon in war is not something derived from sexual urges, but rather suits the ‘hate 
rape’ category.  
4.2.1 Identity politics – the role of ethnicity  
The Belgian colonists divided ethnical groups in both Rwanda and the DRC in a 
divide-and-rule tactic to control the population. In relevance to the current case were 
the explosive results of the Hutu and Tutsi population. Hundreds of thousands Hutu 
refugees from Rwanda fled into the DRC mixing refugees and genocidars with no 
viable return to their home-country. The development of identity politics as in the 
politicization of ethnicity has been used by the FDLR, Interhamwe and the Mayi 
Mayi’s to create political legitimacy by the refugees as well as by the Congolese 
armed groups (Thakur, 2008:18). The key identity conflict is situated in the Kivus 
were the Kinyarwanda lives, referring to Congolese of Rwandan ancestry of both Hutu 
and Tutsi ethnicity. Within this category there is a further differentiation between 
Banyarwanda living in the North Kivu and the Banyamulenge in the South Kivu. Their 
citizenship the last fifty years has been contested and during the second war in the 
DRC, the Kinyarwandans’ identities were manipulated as ‘victims’ through precarious 
Hutu-Tutsi identity lines for political goals by local and regional actors. Their 
identities were also manipulated by the opposing groups like Mayi Mayi, who have 
portrait the Kinyarwandans as ‘allochthony’ or ‘strangers’ and themselves as the 
‘autochthony’ or ‘authentic’ Congolese citizens (ibid). The Mayi Mayi’s feeling of 
‘indigenous’ identity was meant to differentiate themselves from other the 
Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge who were considered to be foreign. More ethnic 
tensions also exist in the Ituri region, the area often termed ‘the bloody corner’ of the 
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DRC, where the Hema and Lendu population share the same territory. The tribal 
battles between the Hema and Lendu population have been fuelled among others by 
Uganda’s Lord’s Resistance Army (Weinstein, 2007:27). The Ituri conflict has the 
dangerous components of the scramble over vast resources in the area combined with 
ethnic tensions in the region.  
 
These identity manipulations by both sides have helped fuel violence over the control 
of the territory and vast resources in the eastern DRC. The combination of ‘state 
failure’ combined with vast resources and ethnic tensions had violent results. Women 
are targeted from the opposing ethnic groups and sexually abused often in the most 
humiliating ways. It also seems likely that warring groups have legitimized sexual 
violence against the perceived out-groups, either through leaders not taking any stands 
or assert it as a useful strategy. By creating an elusive ‘other’ of the perceived 
enemies, extreme violence has been persistent. In the UN and NGO reports, academics 
and the media, women’s body as a battleground is by many portrayed as the most 
effective means to destabilize and break down resistance against the enemy. Brought 
together, more or less organized sexual violence in these areas could be used as means 
to drive unwanted people from their land. Women’s bodies are used as a battleground 
to revenge massacres and rapes by the hated out-group male combats and civilians. 
Sexual violence in war thus becomes a weapon to effectively terrorize and destroy 
communities. There is also evidence of using sexual violence as a form of punishment 
against the local population for allegedly supporting opposing groups. Sexual violence 
thus becomes a form of ‘punitive rape’.  
 
More often, however, the local civilians are often looted by any present warring group. 
Pre-existing ethnic tensions are used by leaders for political and economic motives and 
used to stir up hatred between the groups and sometimes supplying arms to one of the 
sides when convenient (de Vries, 2005:11). Sen (2006:175) argues that the cultivation 
and promotion of creating a feeling of singularity in identity politics can serve a 
specific focus. By separating one identity group from another it serves the violent 
purpose despite the irrationality of seeing one self as serving only one identity. These 
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identities can be a result of prior clashes but perhaps more likely created or added 
perceptions that serve specific goals of power and control over territories, people 
and/or natural resources. The main factor contributing to violence between groups 
might be the competition over resources, while ethnicity is only the tool to mobilize 
strives over these resources. The question is therefore how and why ethnicity is used 
for political purposes. Thus, when analyzing the case of the eastern DRC one should 
be cautious in portraying it as ethnic conflict. Recalling the neo-patrimonialism 
understanding, violent conflicts should rather be seen as tensions between groups over 
resources, power and control in the context of the lack of state authority and control.  
 
4.2.2 Gender relations – the role of masculinity and femininity  
To understand such highly gendered violence, we need to look at the aspect of women 
and men’s role in the society. In terms of women’s role in the eastern DRC, the 
psychologist Justin Kabanga4 argues that women are seen as second-class citizens and 
they do not have the right to take their own decisions in many cases. For instance, 
women are not allowed to own land or find work outside the household without the 
husband’s approval. In general in the DRC, according to Kabanga, a woman’s value is 
through the marriage. Because of this, Kabanga argues that women need to stay 
obedient to their husband in order to have a status. He explained that if the woman is 
sexually abused, it is very likely that her husband does not want her and her value in 
the DRC is practically zero. At the same time, the Congolese women bind the 
community together through providing the agricultural harvests, giving birth and 
nursing the children. Exactly this makes the women a military target for the rebel 
groups and is also thoroughly planned by many of forces, according to Kabanga. By 
sexually abusing women, often in brutal and humiliating ways, women are left 
traumatized. Further, women must flee the area they used to live and becomes 
internally displaces people (IDP’s). The strategy of sexual violence terse down the 
community support for the women and finally destroys the community. Thus, the 
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strategy is indeed useful as a mean to tear down resistance and control areas and hence 
increase the power for the warring groups.   
 
Further, certain dynamics between masculinity and femininity can explain some of the 
consequences war has on already skewed gender relations. First, masculinity in the 
DRC is closely reliant on dominance, where men are both the protector and the 
aggressor in the family and community level (Mechanic, 2004:21). The war situation 
tends to narrow such views of masculinity and emphasize it even more. In this context, 
men often fail to live up to this role when they cannot protect their women against 
other aggressors. In a culture where women are seen as ‘possessions’, a sexual assault 
against a woman is perceived as in assault against the man. The culturally accepted 
roles that men are protectors of ‘their’ women are under threat in a war or conflict 
situation, because it is simply not possible in the socio-economic context. The feelings 
of powerlessness when their women are being sexually abused or they turn to survival 
sex as a form of livelihood can lead to a further reaction of violence against women. 
The men can then more easily choose to join warring groups to restore a sense of 
control through aggression in order to re-achieve masculinity. When other alternatives 
to achieve masculinity, like education or wealth collapses in the context of war, the 
existing alternative can be through the same methods that they lost their masculinity. 
This way is through militarized masculinity at the domestic level, their community or 
against neighbouring communities. The motivation for committing sexual violent acts 
is thus explained by the need to confirm the man’s military masculinity and in this way 
serves the purpose of an essentialist approach.  
 
However, this approach is insufficient as it reduces all men to be inherently aggressive 
and it also lacks explanations for men who become victims of sexual violence. For 
those who commit these acts, a constructivist approach would argue that through 
power and violence, victim is feminized and the perpetrator is masculinised. Sexual 
violence in war is commonly explained by the constructivist scholars through the 
masculinity-femininity linkages, as an effort to humiliate, i.e. feminize, the enemy men 
by tainting their women to prove them inadequate as protectors. What soldiers may 
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fear most in the war is being perceived as ‘unmanly’, timid and weak, characteristics 
that are often associated with femininity. Recalling the FARDC soldiers frustration 
discussed at the individual level, one factor of rationalizing sexual violence against 
other women could be a way of restoring their ‘failed masculinity’. To take another 
example, sexual violence committed by men against men happens in the DRC much 
rarer than against women, but still much more frequent than many assumes. According 
to a male victim of sexual violence interviewed by Amnesty International (2004a:11) 
when the soldiers raped him in front of his wife and children they kept saying “you’re 
no longer a man, you are going to become one of our women”.  
 
However, both the essentials and constructivist approaches are found to be inadequate 
according Baaz & Stern’s (2008:67) study. According to Mechanic (2004:24), many of 
the men who are caught up in this situation are desperate and against their will part of 
a brutal and deadly conflict. Further, the choice to join armed forces was according to 
soldiers from the FARDC never motivated by a vengeful desire of violence, but rather 
a last choice out of the absence of other alternatives (Baaz & Stern, 2008:71). This 
view was also confirmed by the former child soldiers I interviewed. As one of them 
explained:  
 
“It was difficult to obtain food at home and I though a life as a soldier would be better than starving at 
home”  
(Mungu, former Mayi Mayi soldier, age 15).  
 
The other former child soldiers I spoke to confirmed this view by stating that it was 
starvation, lack of educational possibilities and the lack of other economic generating 
possibilities that made them join the militias. Further, Baaz & Stern (ibid) found that 
the military was not a macho place for men as the ideal life is not to live in the bush 
and rape and kill civilians. The popular culture in the DRC represents the successful 
modern and wealthy man with a desk job and nice house in the city surrounded by 
beautiful women, according to Baaz5. Thus, portraying soldiers’ motivation for joining 
armed groups and becoming perpetrators of sexual violence through the traditional 
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debate between essentialist and constructivist thinking is not sufficient. Researchers 
should be aware of the socio-economic context of the DRC as well as cultural factors.  
4.2.2 Symbolic and instrumental violence – how culture matters   
Ethnicity and gender roles seem to have played a certain role as the way sexual 
violence has been used in the war in the DRC. To add to the complexity of motivations 
for committing acts of sexual violence, the Mayi Mayi soldiers have used it as a power 
instrument in a cultural specific manner. The Mayi Mayi rebels have a long history in 
the DRC and the organizational structure is mostly localized and informal and centred 
in the Kivus (Thakur, 2008:5-6). According to MONUC officials (in Thakur, 
2008:13), the Mayi Mayi are mostly unarmed, except for some primitive weaponry. 
However, because of the prevalence of arms trafficking in the DRC, Mayi Mayi’s can 
easily access small arms. Ideologically, they have a strong anti-Tutsi sentiment that 
upholds public support and also recruitment of soldiers. According to Mosafari6, the 
Mayi Mayi has used sexual violence in a slightly different way ideologically speaking 
compared to other groups. Several of the Mayi Mayi fractions have raped children 
whom they know are virgins to get a sort of magical power (de Vries, 2005:12).  
Virgins and even pregnant women are believed to give them invincibility on the 
battlefield (ibid). Raping virgins is also believed to cure HIV/AIDS positive 
combatants, which is a misperception practiced with lethal results in some parts of 
Africa. They have also been accused of raping elderly Pygmy women to receive a sort 
of resistance power against attacks. The Pygmy women are believed to contain 
witchcraft that the Mayi Mayi’s use to defend themselves against violent attacks from 
other militias.  
 
Exactly how common these phenomenons are is practically unknown and it is also 
difficult to know for outsiders whether these are stereotypes or actually traditional 
culture for this group. No matter how common this strategy is, it represents a different 
weapon of war than commonly understood by the public debate. To some extent it 
captures the social constructivism line of thinking when sexual violence is used as a 
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mean to obtain power through the victim, but not perhaps with the intention of 
‘victimizing’ the offended. The victims in turn have from the Mayi Mayi’s point of 
view socially constructed ideas about the role and power the victims are believed to 
contain. Their cultural constructed believes thus result in sexual violence as a weapon 
of war. Rape, cannibalism and other acts of brutal violence committed by the Mayi 
Mayi’s is strategic and instrumental as well as expressive and symbolic for this group 
in order to achieve particular objectives. This is thus a form of community-based 
understanding of local identity and warrior culture.     
 
4.3 The national level – reaching political goals? 
At the macro level, sexual violence can be a leadership strategy of controlling areas 
and is signalled through the chain of combatants. Sexual violence can in this way 
either be seen as a necessary war effort and/or be signalled from the leadership that it 
will not be punished and hence perceived as an accepted behaviour. To make sexual 
violence a macro level approach the military superiors must be seen as a legitimate 
authorities so that soldiers will accept to conduct this extreme violence towards 
civilians (Wood, forthcoming).  Strategical measures are taken by the armed groups in 
the DRC to persuade the government and the international community to ensure that 
they have the capacity to inflict serious costs to illustrate its power (Thakur, 2008:15). 
Severe violations of human rights can be a way accessing the bargaining table, usually 
without any fear of punishments. Militia groups must first represent a threat to security 
by the Congolese government supported by the international actors for then to 
negotiate demands. According to Thakur (ibid), the most significant strategy used by 
the armed groups is attrition against civilians in order to achieve a certain power and a 
social control over local communities. As one MONUC officer stated about the 
warfare in Ituri:  
 
“We had the impression that the soldiers were not fighting each other, but rather the civilian 
population. Missiles were launched haphazardly, without any thought to civilians. What is this war in 
which out of 30 people killed only two are military personnel? These people don’t respect the basic 
rules of warfare. This is a war against civilians and it is always the same!”  
(Officer interviewed in May 2003, Amnesty International, 2005a:4). 
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Thus, the greater costs a group can inflict, the more likely is it that the group 
represents a threat to future security, and hence the more likely is it that the national 
government and the international community will yield to their demands.   
 
The assumption that sexual violence only is a mean to satisfy soldiers’ needs is 
insufficient in terms of the evidence of the victims and the brutality they have been 
exposed to. Cutting of breasts, shooting women in their vagina and raping babies and 
elderly cannot simply be explained with ‘lust’. Here, sexual violence is more of what 
researchers term ‘hate rape’. In a survey done by the International Alert (2005:48), 
57,3 % of the women interviewed were convinced that the foreign forces had plans to 
exterminate the Congolese people through their deliberate extreme and cruel violence. 
It is worth noting here that many Congolese civilians particularly in the Kivus show an 
explicit hatred towards the foreign troops especially from Rwanda, thus these answers 
should be taken with caution.  Further, the foreign troops were viewed by 19 % of the 
women interviewed in the survey as jealous over the DRC’s immense wealth. There is 
no secret that neighbouring countries like Uganda and Rwanda have economic 
motivations for conquest in the DRC. Further, the women argue that the foreign 
combatants in the DRC are chased out of their country and now live in the Congolese 
bushes. As one of the women stated:  
 
“They’ve brought a culture of violence with them – in their country, violence is a national sport”  
(anonymous to International Alert, 2005:49).  
 
Some of these women also believed that there existed a deliberate policy to spread 
HIV/AIDS to entire communities through raping women and in turn that the women 
spread the virus to their husbands and offspring. Others were convinced that foreign 
troops aimed at getting women pregnant with non-Congolese children were a part of 
their plan. During the Rwandan genocide, the HIV/AIDS infected soldiers were 
strategically used in methods of sexual violence to spread the virus to the hated out-
group. This ‘culture of violence’ might to some extent survived among the Interhamwe 
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rebels and the FDLR. According to Kabanga7, the so-called culture of violence was 
brought here by the Rwandan forces when they entered the DRC in 1994 and onwards. 
He argues that the Congolese culture in general respects women and children in war 
and tries to avoid harming them as far as possible. But in the genocide in Rwanda, 
rivals did not separate between groups of who was to survive and who must die. The 
Tutsis as well as moderate Hutus had to be destroyed by all means through killing 
men, women, and children and raping young girls and women to destroy entire 
communities. When Tutsis regained controlled over the country, this sent a hundreds 
of thousands Hutu refugees into the DRC. With nothing to loose and without a nation 
to return to, the Hutu Interhamwe group have inflicted serious violations towards the 
Congolese civilians. On the other hand, the Tutsi groups have inflicted the same type 
of violence towards Hutu Congolese and other ethnic groups as this was the type of 
violence that their ethnic group was subjected to. Thus, there is evidence that since the 
onset of the war in the DRC a culture of violence has erupted and penetrated entire 
regions affected by war.  
 
4.3.1 State decay and sexual violence – are there any correlations?  
Local fighters and rebel groups may have grievances towards the political elites that 
can become instrumental depending on the social context of the war, according to 
Reno (2005:151). But even though they can hate the political elite and those who 
control the economic resources, they might recognize that further violence will not 
bring peace and economic development. However, Reno (ibid) argues that they might 
conclude that joining armed groups is better than becoming a victim as well as 
receiving personal economic gains from violent uprisings. Combined with foreign 
interventions and new channels of trade there are greater opportunities to ignore local 
demands and social constraints that would otherwise inhibit means of accessing 
resources. The atrocities in the DRC were perhaps more a result of the political elite’s 
mismanagement over the years, resulting in generations of young people growing up 
in a socially excluded environment. Decades of these experienced would likely cause 
political, social, economic and moral breakdown among the public (Bøås, 2001:719). 
                                               
7
 Personal interview with Dr. Justin Kabanga in Kinshasa 2008-04-01. 
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The FARDC and the PNC in the DRC have in some reports (see e.g. Ertürk, 2008) 
stated to be one of the major perpetrators of sexual violence. Though these statics 
should be taken with caution (see chapter on methodological concerns), it is evident 
from the analysis about the personal motivations for committing sexually violent 
atrocities is related to the feelings of neglect and impoverishment from the Congolese 
state. Hence, there is a moral breakdown from those who are there to protect the 
civilians from these atrocities. When the juridical institution fails to punish 
perpetrators and the impunity continues, there is perhaps an even higher level of moral 
breakdown as the violence is being normalized throughout the FARDC in the most 
violent regions of the DRC. For the other armed groups in the DRC, a macro level 
strategy of sexual violence would depend on the link between recruits and their 
leaders, thus a dynamic between the individual, the group and the macro level.  
 
Chabal & Daloz (2006:144) argue that the Hutu-Tutsi conflict in Rwanda that has 
continued on Congolese soil should be put in the context within a decaying 
patrimonial political system where political accountability is almost absent. This has 
contributed to increasing economic hardship and rivalry between groups within the 
weakening neo-patrimonial system. This context can allow politicians to legitimize 
violence based on the cultural differences. The notion of this is rooted in the 
understanding that the differences between the groups make it impossible to solve the 
problems peacefully based on the cultural differences. Further, it also sends of the 
signal that any attacks on ‘us’ are intolerable as it is an attack on the entire culture. 
This also leads to the logic that attacks against the ‘outsider’ should be not only 
violent, but preferably an attack on the entire culture. Chabal & Daloz (ibid) hence 
argue that it is not the culture causing violent conflicts, but instead that culture is used 
as an instrumental ideology for political exploitation. Those who feel excluded by the 
state, i.e. those who are not privileged to directly benefit from the state’s resources, 
can seek protection and security from other local actors, e.g. a patron, who can reward 
their followers. However, the variety of leaders claiming to represent a particular 
community has also lead to confusion, rivalry and instability, according to the authors. 
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The inability of leaders to uphold their status reduces the community’s substance and 
can be followed by a take-over by political competitors.  
 
During the transition government from 2003 to 2006 in the DRC, the unification of the 
political and military top level was in reality enemies seeking to enhance their own 
parties’ political, military, symbolic and economic positions (Autesserre, 2006:9). 
Parallel military operations continued at the local and regional level with the aid from 
various actors at the national level. As history repeats, the first who suffered from 
these attacks were the local civilians. Violence including sexual violence was used as a 
threat against villagers to hinder support of other political fractions. The lack of a 
single state authority in the eastern DRC made the violence continue as it seemed like 
the easiest road to wealth and power in areas without law and order. Thus, the 
development of a state authority was cut short with national spoilers supporting 
continues violence by warring groups in the east who would in turn lose everything on 
peace and central government control. However, the foot soldiers of the various 
political fractions were paid too low in terms of basic survival. This enforced soldiers 
to prey on civilians’ livelihoods and among other things using sexual violence against 
those who refused to obey. Further, politicians at the national level used the ethnic 
tensions in the east for support from Congolese citizens on patriotism, hence further 
increasing the local violence based on ethnic hatred.  
 
The state failure where the state hardly can provide any form of security and 
development can been seen as a major factor contributing to the boom of violent non-
state actors. These actors are argued to in general lack discipline in the way war is 
conducted, where they rarely have any education in international law that can prohibit 
war crimes. Wood (forthcoming) argues that combatants follow orders if they have 
had a certain socialization process and training of techniques used in warfare. Further, 
if the goal of an armed group is to govern in the future over a population, it is less 
likely that the leaders will tolerate mass rape of the same population. But the irregular 
warfare strategy in the DRC has made rather small units operate more or less 
independent from their leaders. This can imply that even if the leaders did not want 
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their soldiers to use sexual violence against civilians, they might not be able to stop 
them. In addition, Wood (forthcoming) argues that in order to regulate soldiers 
sexuality, social norms that exist in peace-time must be replicated and internalized in 
the group. This implies that their must be a strong commitment to the organization that 
the soldiers fight for, which entails that he or she must sacrifice everything, including a 
private life. However, from the interviews with former child soldiers, they had been 
recruited as a form of livelihood strategy and had received hardly if any training other 
than given drugs and being tortured. The approach is problematic in the way that it 
assumes that without government control or hierarchical control from rebel leaders, the 
private soldier will indulge in anti-social sexual behaviour, thus reducing Congolese 
men to beasts in the wood preying on civilians. Wood8 argues that if the rebel group is 
reliant on voluntary linking with the local population, they are much more restrained to 
use abusive violent means. But the case in the eastern DRC is that they are reliant on 
the local population, but through coercion. Here, raping and looting often goes 
together. Further, Wood argues that the lack of aspiration to govern means that there 
are fewer reasons to restrain sexual violence in the absence of state-building activity. 
Thus, there seems to be somehow a slight correlation between the failure of a coherent 
state and widespread sexual violence by rivalling warring groups.  
4.4. Concluding remarks  
Before turning to a comparative discussion on the efforts of Liberia and the DRC to 
prevent or deal with widespread sexual violence, a summary and conclusion of the 
above analysis will be needed. At the individual level the role of women and men in 
the society appeared to be a condition leading to the abuse of women. Thus the 
conditions were already set before the war broke out in 1996 and again in 1998. The 
idea that soldiers ‘need’ sex was also considered to be a factor contributing to sexual 
slavery where women were abducted to provide for sexual as well as domestic 
services.  While men get killed, women are targeted for their agricultural productivity 
and can (often by coercion) secure soldiers day to day survival. In addition, the 
personal motivations among soldiers in the FARDC seemed to be affected by their 
                                               
8
 Personal conversation with Elisabeth Wood 2008-05-29, PRIO, Oslo.  
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feelings of neglect from the authorities and the poor conditions they were subjected to. 
The soldiers could not fulfil their role as a provider in the family, and sexual violence 
was seen as an expression of this suffering and frustration. Thus, some of the abuse 
discussed at the individual level seems to be directly linked to the poor socio-
economic development in the DRC. At the group level, sexual violence could be seen 
as a weapon to exert domination over a community or a group, for instance through 
ethnical disagreements. However, it might be more likely from the national level 
discussion that it is rather the control over resources that has led to sexual violence as a 
weapon to gain control over mineral-rich areas. There was also evidence of culturally 
factors among Mayi Mayi soldiers, though only briefly discussed, where sexual 
violence was linked to magical power for the perpetrators. More at the macro level, 
being a security threat and committing severe human rights violations might be the 
only and easiest way to be a part of the bargaining table and getting power at the state 
level. Further, the deterioration of the state and decades of mismanagement has led to 
generations of excluded youths that further developed moral, social, economic and 
political breakdown.  
 
This analysis provided only some of the explanations for using sexual violence in the 
recent war in the DRC. From these perspectives one can conclude that the socio-
economic status of perpetrators and victims appears to be of significance to sexual 
violence. Gender inequalities and poverty are elements persistent in the DRC. At the 
national level, the failure of the neo-patrimonial state to distribute wealth to clients has 
contributed to competition over resources and led to extreme violence in areas without 
any government control. The atrocities in the DRC continue and the situation must 
change to prevent further violence. Hence this thesis will now entail a discussion on 
some of the possible approaches to deal with sexual violence and discuss some of the 
lessons learned from Liberia.   
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PART III Comparing future prospects and challenges   
5.0 Lessons learned from Liberia 
Liberia is slowly recovering after 14 years of civil war from 1989 to 2003, where there 
is evidence of a high number of victims exposed to various types of gender-based 
violence, including sexual violence. Several reliable reports indicate high numbers of 
victims of sexual violence during the civil war and it continues to be a major crime in 
post-conflict Liberia. Thus, the current president, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf and her 
government developed the National Gender-based Violence Plan of Action both to 
respond to violations during the civil war and abuses that continue to occur in Liberia. 
In the first part of this analysis we will discuss some of the comparativeness of Liberia 
and DRC and the recent wars the countries have been through. After that, the 
emphasize will be on some of the policy issues, specifically gender equality, human 
rights and juridical concerns, related to dealing with sexual violence in war and 
problems related to this using the theoretical framework from the development and 
gender discussion. From the UN and several women’s group, Liberia has been viewed 
as a ‘poster child’ after Johnson-Sirleaf became president in January 2006, while the 
DRC has been viewed as ‘a basket case’ in resolving the issue of sexual violence in 
war. This simplistic understanding is of course not sufficient to explain the disparities 
and problems in the two countries. At the same time, Liberia has taken some serious 
steps to prevent and prohibit sexual violence and it is worth discussing some of these 
efforts to see if they are applicable to the DRC.    
5.1 Similarities  
Both Liberia and the DRC fit the description of a neo-patrimonial state when war 
erupted. The Liberian state functioned as an exchange between the legal, bureaucratic 
structure and the patron-client framework (Bøås, 2003:429). As in the case of the 
DRC, the weak bureaucratic state structure was able to maintain stability and order as 
long as there existed means and resources to clients. The two state systems were both 
unjust in the way that the state’s resources were used to protect the political and 
economic elite and as personal consumption among the state actors. Problems started 
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evolving in the 1970’s for Liberia when increasing parts of the resources that was 
meant to maintain the clientilistic system were consumed privately. In addition, a 
growing number of people were incorporated into the neo-patrimonial system to 
maintain stability and dependence. The result was that the Liberian distribution and 
redistribution system collapsed and the state lost its legitimacy. Samuel Doe were 
among the group of young officers who took control over the country in a military 
coup the 12th of April 1980. Doe and his followers first enjoyed much support as 
civilians celebrated what they saw as the end of brutal leadership as well as apartheid, 
meaning that ‘native’ Liberians where held down by the Americo-Liberians who 
arrived as liberated slaves from the US, which will be discussed further in the next 
chapter. However, the neo-patrimonial tradition continued as the new political actors 
sought to enrich themselves and their ethnic group, according to Bøås (2003:432). The 
difference was that when civil war erupted in 1989, there became more and more 
military fractions that exerted their control over territories and population, and caused 
thousands of civilian causalities.  
 
The motives for waging war was perhaps also in a sense comparable with the DRC in 
the way that the groups wanted to get rid of first president Doe than later president 
Taylor in Liberia, and first president Mobutu and later Laurent Kabila in the DRC. 
According to Moran & Pitcher (2004:505), the outbreak of war in Liberia was 
triggered by the war in Sierra Leone and of instability in neighbouring Guinea and 
Côte d’Ivoire that eventually spread violence in the entire area of Mano River Union. 
The instability from the genocide in Rwanda and neighbouring Burundi has by some 
argued to be one of the main causes of the outbreak of full scale war in the Great 
Lakes region of the DRC. Economic incentives were also of importance as the two 
countries developed an informal war economy. The war economy developed into a 
way of surviving and receiving benefits.  However, Bøås (2003:437) argue that the 
main reason for the civil war in Liberia was the history of suppression and the failure 
of the neo-patrimonial state to deliver its goods. The two wars continued as both 
Charles Taylor and Laurent Kabila took power as presidents and turned out to be 
anything but unifying representatives of the state. They continued the tradition of neo-
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patrimonialism and used the state’s resources as their own private resources. In this 
view, armed groups in the DRC and Liberia have emerged from a profoundly 
dysfunctional and corrupt neo-patrimonial state. A future challenge for the security 
and development of the two countries has and continues to be the lack of a 
consolidated state; a state not only serving the urban centres and elite but also the rural 
population. This is one of the main challenges for building a comprehensive strategy 
which spans from the state development to the local level.   
 
Comparing some of the development aspects of the DRC and Liberia is also useful to 
understand the poverty issues, lack of education and gender inequality and in turn 
frustration and grievance among the public. Sub-Saharan Africa in general have 
represented an exception in the Human Development Index (HDI), as the region have 
reversed or stagnated its HDI compared to other regions of the world in the post Cold 
War era. The stagnation is in large parts caused by the HIV/AIDS endemic that reveals 
its victims in this type of index. It is also due to the wars and conflicts that deteriorate 
people’s already low living standards. Unfortunately, the statics from the HDI 
2007/2008 are rather incomplete. While the DRC is ranked at place number 168 in 
2007/2008 report, where Sierra Leone is at the ultimate ‘failure’ at number 177, 
Liberia has not a sufficient amount of statics to receive a ranking position. There is no 
statistics on the public expenditures on education in both of the countries and measures 
on literacy and enrolment is also rigorously limited. However, it is clear that none of 
the two countries have impressive development results as the life expectancy at birth is 
44,7 in Liberia and 45,8 in the DRC from the (Human Development Report, 
2007/2008:222-3).   
 
As the wars in Liberia and the DRC demonstrated, the civilians represented the 
majority of victims of these clashes between militias and the army. Looting villages 
and raping civilians has been common in both cases. Another major issue from the 
Liberian civil war was the number of child soldiers recruited to various fractions of the 
militias (Bøås, 2003:441). As the situation in Liberia gradually destabilized and 
civilians increasingly became vulnerable, militias attracted Liberian children and youth 
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as a form of protection that other authorities could not provide. In the onset of the first 
war in 1996, Laurent Kabila and his militia, The Alliance of Democratic Forces for the 
Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFL), deliberately recruited child soldiers as a strategy 
to forcefully overthrow Mobutu and his decaying regime.9 The guerrilla fighting in the 
DRC was in general not based on clear strategies for waging war, but rather severe 
brutality and enhancing the young soldiers’ fearlessness for fighting. Since then, 
children and minors have been used in all the militia groups in the DRC as well as the 
national army (ibid footnote).  
 
In terms of violations of human rights, neither the wars in Liberia nor the DRC is an 
exception and is in fact quite similar in many cases. The majority of victims of sexual 
violence were in both cases found in remote areas, far away from the capitals 
Monrovia and Kinshasa. As in the DRC, the Liberian female victims were sexually 
abused and then left behind or they were held as captive ‘wives’ until they were able to 
escape (Turshen & Twagiramariya, 1998:131). In both cases, sexual violence cases 
correlated with areas where the conflict was intense and prolonged. The brutality of 
violence was similarly found in the DRC as many victims were forced to watch and 
applaud when atrocities were committed against other family members, friends or 
neighbours. Civilians represented increasingly the main target and the humiliation and 
traumatisation components were thus found in both cases to inflict most terror in the 
society. The psychological trauma is severe for both the victims and their families and 
many suffer in silence for the attacks they have been subjected to. Further, as the civil 
war in Liberia and the war and conflict in the DRC were protracted, more and more 
women were victims of sexual abuse.  
 
In Liberia, there is a division among the women in the aftermath of the civil war since 
some were not ‘passive’ in the armed struggle (IRIN, 2004:21). A number of the 
women fought alongside the men and others were ‘bush wives’ who worked as sex 
slaves and also provided food and cleaning for the rebels. These ‘bush wives’ were 
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 Personal interview with Adolph Mosafari, the manager of a development skills project for children and youth 
in Bukavu 2008-04-06.   
 57 
basically temporarily attached through force by rebels and provided domestic services, 
thus a form of ‘temporary wives’. The women who survived have returned to their 
villages but are stigmatized from those women who were portrayed as more ‘passive 
victims’. Girls and women in the DRC has also taken up arms and joined militias, 
either with force or of free will. There are also many evidences of the ‘bush wife’ 
dilemma as an unknown number of women, including the majority of those I have 
interviewed, were held as captives by armed groups. Women’s productivity in terms of 
cooking, washing, nursing etc. is used as a resource to survival of the soldiers who are 
inadequately equipped for long-term survival in the forests. I would argue that women 
are taken as captives so that soldiers can live in a more ‘normalized’ situation in the 
inhuman condition they are subjected to. In terms of policy making, this represents a 
challenge for measures taken against sexual violence. Gender roles during conflicts 
and war can temporarily open up for redefinitions of men and women’s role that need 
to be included in future responses to this type of gender-based violence. This will be 
discussed in the gender analysis below.  
5.2 Differences   
In terms of the civil war in Liberia from 1989, the regional influences were more 
mixed compared to the DRC where the latter case can be perceived more as a regional 
war fought on Congolese soil. The Taylor-government supported war in the 
neighbouring countries through warring groups and thus fuelled the war in particularly 
Sierra Leone. This can have implications in policy making in the way that Liberia is 
less fragile to foreign peace spoilers and thus perhaps more easily can focus on state 
capacity-building. Different from the DRC, as well as many other sub-Saharan 
countries, Liberia has an exceptional history of being an independent African republic 
since the mid 19th Century. Liberia was declared as a free republic for former slaves 
from the US, known as Americo-Liberians. The natives in Liberia and the Americo-
Liberians lived in deep mistrust against each other and the Americo-Liberians quiet 
successfully dominated the indigenous. Liberia has also experienced a unique 
economic growth in the mid 20th century that at some point had the highest economic 
growth after Japan (Moran & Pitcher, 2004:505). A combination of falling prices for 
Liberia’s two main export commodities, rubber and iron ore, and a deep dissatisfaction 
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among the ‘native’ Liberians paved the way for a military coup in 1980. The DRC, on 
the other hand, was ruled as a private state under Leopold and were subjected to a 
Belgian colonialism that had implications for their development and some would argue 
of gender relations. In the DRC, the men were encouraged to work in the mining 
business while women were mostly left at home running the family farm. Most of the 
women in the DRC were peasants and colonial rule is believed to have had a negative 
effect on peasant women’s status (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1997:59). The argument to 
explain this was that colonialism created an unbalance between the genders as the 
women’s workload increased through peasantry, while the economic benefits gained 
men, according to Coquery-Vidrovitch (1997:63-64). In the Central and Eastern Africa 
region during colonialism, women’s rights were affected by favouring the husband as 
the head of the household, leaving widows and divorced women in a particular 
difficult situation. The laws from the colonial period and the Zairian-period 
disproportionally favoured men, separating the women (and children) as subordinate 
citizens. The women’s agricultural work did not become to the same extent a part of 
the national economy because most of it went unpaid, while the cash-crops were to a 
large extent controlled by men. Hence, women’s exclusion from the Western 
capitalism was noticeable in parts of the Sub-Saharan African region during 
colonialism. 
 
The effects on sexuality and gender views were noticeable in the Belgian Congo, 
compared to the more or less independent state Liberia at the same time period. The 
Christian missionaries introduced what Coquery-Vidrovitch (1997:144) calls Christian 
patriarchy; the contradiction of a Christianization without Westernization. On the one 
hand, the Belgian missionaries tried to keep the ‘good’ traditions in the Congolese 
society and avoid broad-minded education. On the other hand, they were conflicted 
with the traditional customs of polygamy, traditional ritual and teenage marriages. The 
missionary ideology further deepened the traditional role of women as housewives into 
the colonial age wife and thus emphasized the difference between the sexes and male 
superiority. Men were given agricultural training and encouraged to cultivate for 
colonial export. Women, on the other hand, were taught to practice housekeeping and 
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developing their motherhood skills. This more or less was a continuation of the same 
practices and thus represented convenient traditions for Belgium colonial missionaries. 
While education of Congolese men evolved, women’s development was mostly based 
on morality and their role as good wives and mothers. School-enrolment was low, 
about 15%, among girls in the beginning of the 20th century and literacy was seen as a 
distraction for duties and for girls’ mental health in this missionary ideology (Coquery-
Vidrovitch, 1997:145). The result was unequal higher education and more income-
generating jobs for the Congolese men in relation to Congolese women.  
 
Compared to the DRC, Liberia had a significant number of educated, professional 
women despite a familiar patriarchal ideology shared with the DRC, especially when 
the war erupted in 1989 (Moran & Pitcher, 2004:506-7). The civil war itself in Liberia 
opened up for a different but active role of women in central positions in the Taylor-
government as well as female fighters. Women’s role also changed in the way that 
many became victims of war. The role of women in politics has been very different 
between the West African states and Central Africa, particularly the case of the DRC. 
Political activism and lobbying by women has been rare in the DRC. What perhaps 
have differentiated between the DRC and Liberia is that women in Liberia has been 
much more successful and active in organizing various groups responding to health 
issues, reconciliation efforts and criminal and human rights cases. This can perhaps be 
an influence from the US education and support of the liberated slaves. In particular, 
the Association of Female Lawyers of Liberia (AFELL), coordinated with the 
Monrovia-based NGO Centre for Abused Women and Girls, documented women’s 
various roles during the war (AFELL et al., 1998:131). Despite an increasing political 
will and programme goals for a more gender-balanced government and engaging 
women in peace-building in the DRC, the actual number of educated women has been 
low, according to Dr Kuye-Ndondo10. The unrivaled educational imbalance between 
the genders during the colonial period was further increased after independence. 
Around the 1970’s, after eighty years of education, the results showed that only a few 
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 Personal interview in Oslo 2008-03-08. Dr Kuye-Ndondo is a senator in the Kabila government and currently 
the vice-president for the Peace, Security and Development Commission in North and South Kivu.   
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hundred female nurses and teachers, no female doctors and one assistant teacher at the 
University level was the educational status for Congolese women (Coquery-
Vidrovitch, 1997:147). Coquery-Vidrovitch (ibid) argues that both the European and 
the African tradition of women dependence had reinforced each others gender 
inequalities during Belgian colonialism as well as afterwards, creating this gender 
imbalance in the DRC.  
 
An apparent difference about the two countries is their respective geographical size. 
This issue may have implications for level of governance and nationally based gender 
plans. There is great concern that neither the UN peacekeepers nor the national army 
has been able to prevent or end the violence the eastern part of the DRC. It is also 
argued from the analysis above that the national army themselves represents a severe 
threat against civilians in terms of sexual violence and they are argued to be 
responsible for parts of these acts in the DRC. Thus, those who are there to prevent the 
violence are unable and even represent a danger for the civilians of sexually violent 
attacks. The impunity of criminal acts is even more severe in the more remote areas of 
the country. At the same time, however, the much smaller size of Liberia did not 
prevent the civil war and it was clear that the areas remote from the capital was 
subjected to intense fighting and human atrocities. The geographical size should not be 
an excuse for lack of prevention or action, but it still might remain a challenge for 
effectively implemented policies from the national level, which will be further 
discussed below.  
 
It is not only the geographical size that is vast in the DRC, but also the size of the 
population compared to Liberia. From the Human Development Report 
(2007/2008:246), the DRC has a population of almost 60 million people compared to 
Liberia with approximately 3,5 million people.  Again, this is not an excuse for the 
lack of prevention and ending the violence, but it remains a challenge for a country 
with severe infrastructure limitations and weak institutions to deal with the crisis. The 
development implications from the HDI reveals that the Liberian GDP growth has a 
positive rate of 2,3% annual growth from 1990-2005, while the DRC has a negative 
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development with -5,2% in annual GDP development. It is worth noting here that the 
abundant resources has the economic potential both nationally and internationally in 
the DRC, for instance it could in theory supply all of Africa with its hydro electoral 
potential. Despite this, imports of food supply is high as well as relentless failure of 
the state to develop the infrastructure, has not made the DRC self-sufficient at this 
stage and probably not for many years to come. Ending the circle of violence and 
dealing with the war economy will have to involve the overall socio-economic 
development of the country. Liberia, on the other hand, is not conditioned with the 
same natural prosperity as the DRC. This is perhaps an advantage for Liberia 
according to ‘the resource curse’ debate often discussed in African warfare.11 From 
this debate, the argument is often that wars are able to persist and prolonged as the 
illegal war economy develops and persists. Powerful armed groups and warlords 
benefit from the lack of rule of law in conflict and thus opposed to the stability that 
peace generates. These spoilers can be termed conflict entrepreneurs who exploit the 
prevalence of insecurity and uncertainty of the future prospects for the country for 
their own power maximation for instance through terror means and identity politics 
(Eide, 2001). Needless to say, these conflict entrepreneurs represent a challenge at all 
the levels of successful policy implementing efforts.  
 
5.3 Addressing future responses   
In this section, the analysis will focus on the possible alternative for addressing the 
causes found in the analysis above of sexual violence with reference to the theoretical 
framework of development and gender perspectives. The analysis will be centred on 
both the Liberian and the Congolese efforts to prevent and deal with widespread 
sexual violence and compare their efforts and the possible gaps and challenges. The 
structure of this section is to apply local, national and international level discussions 
on approaches to sexual violence using the gender and development perspectives.  It is 
important to address various levels as it is not only a few people or one government 
that can end the widespread use of sexual violence during conflict and its aftermath. In 
                                               
11
 For more debate see e.g. Robinson et al (2006) ”Political foundations of the resource curse” in the Journal of 
Development Economics, vol. 79, pp. 447-468 
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addition, dealing with sexual violence should ideally combine various actors in a more 
coherent approach.  
5.3.1 The international level  
Gender equality – addressing attitudes and status 
Benjamin & Murchison (2004:23) argue that all prevention programs against sexual 
violence have a common objective of reaching gender equality. Perhaps a bit naïve, 
the authors state that if this objective is achieved, sexual violence will be conceived as 
an unacceptable and deviant behaviour even in conflict situations and will no longer be 
an invisible norm. However, they argue that in societies where large gender 
inequalities persist and women are seen as ‘properties’, the conditions seem to 
correlate with the degree of sexual violence in war. War is often at the heart of 
masculinity and when perceiving women as ‘properties’, rape and other forms of 
sexual violence is an assault against the honour of the men, according to the authors. 
Thus, it is a moral offend, rather than a criminal act of violence. This was even a 
perception that was formally included in the Congolese rape law from 1987 (Rehn & 
Johnson-Sirleaf, 2002:101). One could argue from a Western gender equality 
perspective that it is a lack of respect for women and equality between the genders. 
War-time sexual violence also reflects at another level the sexual violence in peace-
time. Since it already persists in societies without much punishment for the 
perpetrators and justice for the victims, war-time sexual violence can to an extent be 
accepted through cultural norms and political structures. In line with the gender 
equality approach one could argue that sexual violence in war should be dealt with at 
the same level of intolerance as other forms of violence, as it represent severe damages 
to entire societies. There is also the need to address the gender differences in 
perceptions of sexual violence, according to Benjamin & Murchison (2004:27). In the 
majority of cases, sexual violence often directly harms girls and women and men 
might not see sexual violence as a problem unless they gain some new perspectives. 
The authors argue that men also must have a sense of ownership to the problem so that 
ending sexual violence is not solely an outside effort but close cooperation with all the 
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stakeholders. Men’s perception of why conflict and war increases cases of sexual 
violence against women are of high relevance of reaching gender equality goals.  
 
The UN Security Council’s Resolution 1325 on “Women, Peace and Security” 
(Resolution 1325) is aimed at changing the perceptions that women are by-products of 
war to instead perceiving them as starting points. The development of the Resolution 
1325 is perceived by many as the final legal commitment to include women in conflict 
prevention and peace-building. It explicitly condemns sexual violence and demands 
that all parties in the conflict act to prevent it (Karamé, 2004a:21). It also encourages a 
more gender-balanced peace initiative that are argued to detect certain problems and 
challenges at an earlier stage (Helland & Kristensen, 2004:85). Most of all, perhaps, 
was the instrumental value of Resolution 1325 in shifting the UN system from words 
to action. The goal for Resolution 1325 is to mainstream gender implying that both 
men and women’s concerns and experiences are taken into considerations at all levels, 
politically, economically, and socially, so that benefits are equally shared (Karamé, 
2004b:12).  The problem with gender policies are often that they are viewed as an ‘add 
on’ or as ‘women issues’ that competes over resources with more important matters of 
recovery and reconciliation. The Deputy Minister for Research and Technical Services 
at Ministry of Gender and Development in Liberia, Annie Jones Demen (2006:6) also 
argued that it is important that Liberia experiences a national ownership so that 
Liberians can feel responsible for implementation and secure the sustainability of the 
plan. By this, she argued that the international community must provide for the 
sufficient funding, but the policies should be generated nationally with support from 
the civil society. Thus, issues of sexual violence are dealt with from local and national 
actors rather than outside actors who are less sensitive about of cultural complexity.  
  
The international way of working with policies is often centred on the state’s capacity 
to indentify and deal with major concerns as this is in the ideal of the Western model 
of a state. The idea is that the central government’s efforts can be instructive in 
changing destructive parts of the society. Liberia’s National Gender-based Violence 
Plan of Action (NPoA) that came into effect in 2006 has been conceived by many as 
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one of Liberia’s major accomplishments as ‘poster child’ for other post-conflict 
societies, particularly among the UN and women’s group. The NPoA is in theory in 
line with Resolution 1325 and on paper Liberia has impressing results of a gender 
section in every county. However, Schia12 found that these offices were in practice not 
functioning in the areas he visited. As the Deputy Minister Demen (2006:6) asserted, 
some of the main challenges for NPoA were to have all the resources needed in a post-
war setting were multiple actors compete over resources for peace recovery. This is in 
general a challenge for the poor post-conflict countries to implement what the 
international actors of peace-building programs demand.  
 
The DRC have also in theory developed a macro strategy through the Congolese 
government, several NGO’s and the UN called “The joint initiative on the fight against 
sexual violence”.13  According to Ikoli14 in UNFPA, the joint initiative is a holistic 
approach to elaborate the response to sexual violence and represents a framework for 
action. The initiative has implemented action plans in five provinces in the eastern 
DRC, including the Kivus. But according to Gardner15 in USAID, a national plan like 
the one in Liberia against sexual violence in the DRC is not a solution. The main 
reason, according to her, was that the DRC is such a huge country and each province 
can appear as separate countries. The security situation in each of these provinces is 
also different, varying for instance in terms of IDP’s and their vulnerability and 
separate militia groups. Since the actors vary, so should the responses, according to 
Gardner. She further stated the best solution to deal with sexual violence could be both 
a national plan that has an overarching guiding principals but also a prevention plan 
for each province to respond to issues of vulnerability and action. One of the main 
problems for the DRC is coordinating responses to sexual violence because of its size 
and lack of infrastructure. The gaps in coordination were found in all levels in the 
                                               
12
 Personal conversation 2008-06-04 with Niels Nagelhus Schia at the Norwegian Institute of International 
Affairs (NUPI). Schia recently finished a fieldwork in Liberia on resolution 1325 as a part of comparative 
research on Resolution 1325’s challenges in Liberia and the DRC.   
13
 MONUC news downloaded 2008-04-20 at http://www.monuc.org/News.aspx?newsId=16920  
14
 Personal interview in Kinshasa 2008-03-31. Mireille Ikoli is the program officer of gender at UNFPA in the 
DRC.  
15
 Personal interview in Kinshasa 2008-03-31. Allyson Gardner is the USAID Deputy Program Officer in the 
DRC. 
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North-Kivu, ranging from coordinating the police forces, reaching the victims, and the 
inefficiency of the legal system, according to Becquevort in the Norwegian Refugee 
Council (NRC).16 
 
Despite many similarities of internationally recognised principles of gender equality 
goals, the NPoA and the joint initiative are not similar in the sense that the efforts in 
the DRC represent a program mostly through the UN departments, while the NPoA is 
characterized by a strong political will by the current government where President 
Johnson-Sirleaf proclaimed zero tolerance to GBV. The lack of internal political will 
can be crucial in the degree of success for action plans and can perhaps also reduce the 
national ownership. President Kabila has not officially made any clear stands on the 
issue of sexual violence in the DRC. On the contrary, the Deputy Health Minister (in 
de Vries, 2005:18) stated in 2005 when answering Amnesty’s questions about why 
there were so little priority given to victims of sexual violence that the government 
could not establish a macro policy against this issue because it was seen as an isolated 
phenomena and not an endemic like cholera. This reduces sexual violence in war to 
nothing more than a private matter – a spoil of war – and not in the need for a national 
approach for prevention or justice. In general, the major challenges for both Liberia 
and the DRC are to fund the demands from international actors and will most likely be 
a further problem when the UN operations withdraw. It also remains to see if these 
gender equality goals are something the government finds worth pursuing when the 
donors are reduced after Liberia and the DRC becomes more stable. Further, a 
government’s internal sovereignty, based on the Western models, takes the form of 
govern its operations and policies (Eriksen, 2001:18). However, this has not always 
been possible in post-conflict states. We return now to a discussion about development 
approaches.  
 
The disastrous failure of modernization approached through macro-economic 
strategies for development like the structural adjustment program and the unrealistic 
                                               
16
 E-mail correspondence with Alexandre Becquevort in the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), 2008-03-31 
09:39. Becquevort  is the head of office in South Kivu. Available through becquevortalexandre@nrcdrc.org   
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ideals in dependency theories have made some scholar analysis on development 
critical of macro approaches. At the same time, the new approaches for peace 
operations in low HDI countries has a close link to development approaches and it 
focus on the macro level changes, but increasingly through the local levels. This thesis 
will discuss two of the most popular approaches to ending sexual violence: 
Implementation of human rights and international law standards through building the 
justice system, which are both goals through the international agenda of peace-
building.  
 
Human Rights – implementing western values in Sub-Saharan Africa?  
Traditionally, human rights concerns have been dealt with through two categories: The 
state and its citizens (Eide, 2004:12). Violence between civilians has traditionally not 
been viewed as human rights issues. However, violence between civilians is through 
the traditional human rights perspective argued to be the state’s responsibility to 
protect its citizens and in particular more vulnerable groups to prevent violations. The 
notion of the modern state is to establish a set of political and civil rights that entails 
all citizens under the same laws and human rights (Eriksen, 2001:19). Ideally, this 
means that all citizens are equal before the law. The state further should provide 
investigations when allegations are brought up and punish violators, and it should also 
compensate for the victims. However, the so-called state failure of the DRC and 
Liberia has made the UN intervention together with other international NGO (INGO) 
and NGO’s the main speakers of the human rights situation. Benjamin & Murchison 
(2004:26), again naively, state that successful prevention programs in post-war 
societies have promoted human rights and dignity as desired cultural norms in most 
societies. They argue that when sexual violence is publically discussed as human 
rights violations, it is no longer a private problem but a crime against basic human 
rights and sometimes even a crime against humanity. Ideally, all citizens are equal 
before the law, but since this is not the situation for women in the DRC and in Liberia, 
some argue that women should be given special rights as a group. Strickland & 
Duvvury’s (2003:22) review of relevant cases has demonstrated that a broad human 
right’s framework where women’s rights are guaranteed and national commitment to 
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non-discrimination of rights is high, the gains are more long term. In general, a human 
rights based approach further develops the goals of gender equality and empowerment 
as it, ideally, gives all people the possibility the power to access agency and influence 
over their own future. However, these Western ideals are a long-term process that 
relates to the overall development framework of governance, education, gender 
equality. Training programs supported through the UN and other human rights 
organizations that focus on the practice of traditional norms might be more 
approachable for stakeholders concerned. At the same time, there need to be a focus on 
the more short-term practical approaches of protection as spreading ideas of human 
rights value will not suddenly end the endemic.  
 
The Taylor-government in Liberia is not known for its focus on human rights and 
several accusations, notably the special court for Sierra Leone, state that Taylor was 
the main person responsible for crimes against humanity, including sexual slavery and 
rape (HRW news, 2006)17. Even today, Liberian’s rights depend on the individual 
person’s attachment to either the so-called ‘civilized’ or the ‘native’ people, as 
officially stated in “Revised rules and regulations governing the hinterland of Liberia 
(2000:25). The rules apply differently varying on their social standing in the society as 
well as gender. The state in the DRC has also failed to live up to these expectations 
from human rights advocates. According to Dr Kuye-Ndondo18, internal conditions 
and external causes have caused a neglect of human rights. Internally, human rights 
were violated through the Mobutu dictatorship and the general public in the DRC were 
not informed about such rights. Mosafari19, working with child skills development in 
Bukavu, stated that the government have disregarded children’s rights, which further 
has led people into poverty. The inhuman conditions these children live under, makes 
them commit terrible acts, according to Mosafari. Externally, the foreign invaders 
were forces who themselves had been victims of human rights violations in 
neighbouring Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda.  
                                               
17
 Downloaded 2008-05-14 at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/03/29/liberi13103.htm  
18
 Personal interview in Oslo 2008-03-08  
19
 Personal interview with Adoplh Mosafari in Bukavu 2008-04-06.  
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One of the main problems at the macro-level human rights approach is that the 
instrumental value of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as the 
Geneva Conventions and the UN Charter all basically depend on effective states, 
according to Clapham (2002:777). An effective state can be held responsible for 
misdeeds and the declarations are means to contain, control or reform failing or 
collapsing states. The former colonial states were expected to deliver a range of 
demands from the industrialized world that they were not equipped to meet. Not only 
were such rights not held equal for all citizens but the war situation worsened the 
state’s failure and control over more remote areas. Moral demands like ‘human rights’ 
are in addition a rather recent invention and the weakened post-conflict Liberian state 
as well as the fragile base of DRC statehood during and after the wars profoundly 
weakened the state’s guarantee for its citizens. The discriminatory attitudes against 
‘native’ Liberians laid the foundation for unequal rights in Liberia and the civil war 
deteriorated the situation for many civilians. Further, the development of the modern 
state in Europe has been a history of violence, where liberal political structures are 
something that most recently developed, according to Clapham (2002:791). The 
modern human rights are also a result of a long development under various tensions 
and ideas in the Western modernization process (Pirjola, 2005:14-15). Sen (2006:98) 
further argues that many glorifies individual rights as something traditionally found in 
the Western ‘civilized world’, but the reality is that the West has an important role in 
undermining these rights in other countries and in particular in Africa. One can 
therefore question the Western efforts legitimizy of promoting such rights in countries 
they earlier have been the main violators of in the Sub-Saharan countries and in 
particular the DRC. The US history and the absence of colonialism in Liberia, on the 
contrary, might have a more prosperous condition for successfully implementing these 
Western values, i.e. if they can be perceived as culturally valued norms.  
 
Ending impunity - developing an effective justice system  
What is often discussed in the international advocacy literature as well as international 
law and peace-building efforts is to end the impunity for perpetrators. These are
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standardized laws meant to prohibit human rights violations and war crimes and 
punish those responsible. This is to convey a moral demand for a more peaceful world-
order from the lessons learned in the history of wars in the Western world. However, 
what has been a tendency in earlier peace agreements is to incorporate serious 
violators of international justice into high-profiled positions in a transition 
government. This is also why means of terror against civilians, like widespread use of 
sexual violence, is such an effective way of getting to the bargaining table in chaotic 
environments without an effective judicial system. Yet, it should be noted that the 
judicial system in war situations is always problematic and is not at all a problem only 
in African countries. The dilemma of ending war, an emergency project, has perhaps 
the down-side of ignoring the longer-term issues of solutions for the civilian survivors. 
As the deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General in MONUC, Heile 
Menkeros, asserted, the peace-operation would first focus on peace and later deal with 
justice (in Thakur, 2008:12). This is a clear example of the dilemma termed the ‘peace 
vs. justice’ debate where it is difficult to get the voices of victims heard when the 
warring groups set the roadmap for peace. Sexual violence is perhaps also perceived 
more as a ‘women’s issue’ in the way that it disproportionally and more directly 
affects women, while those at the bargaining table in most cases are men concerned 
with other issues. Developing an effective legal system has ideally the moral effect of 
holding people accountable for crimes they have committed, which in turn sends a 
message to other possible perpetrators that such an act is not only morally 
unacceptable but also that it will have consequences for the offender. The impunity 
that often exists in war situations can open up for allowing violent desires. Further, if 
there are already weak pre-existing social norms against sexual violence this can be 
associated with the increase of such violence in war. Sexual violence is so common 
place that it is a part of the everyday life and can become marginalized as a subject. 
The marginalization means that sexual violence has reduced meaning for sectors in the 
fragile society and hence lacks incentives to effectively deal with the crimes.  
 
The International Criminal Court (ICC) has been present in both the DRC and Liberia 
against central rebel leaders. In Liberia, Taylor has been in Hague’s criminal court 
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since 2007, yet not for his own country but because of the civil war in Sierra Leone 
(BBC news, 2008-02-26)20. Taylor is charged for targeting civilians in mutilations and 
sexual violence through arming children under the age of fifteen to commit these 
terrors. In the DRC, there are several conspiracy theories among Congolese citizens 
concerning that the UN and other Western organizations are supporting one side of the 
conflict. They have been accused for supporting current president Kabila, who is also a 
former rebel leader, while punishing his main opposition Jean-Pierre Bemba, another 
rebel leader and successful business man, who came second in the presidential election 
in 2006. Bemba was captured in Belgium this year and the ICC has charged him for 
committing crimes against humanity, specifically involving looting, killings of 
civilians and mass rape against hundreds of women (BBC news, 2008-05-25)21. 
MONUC and the European Unions’ support of the FARDC, which also include 
several rebels and found to be one of the DRC’s main perpetrators of sexual violence, 
further increase this suspicion. This sends out the signal that some perpetrators are 
accepted while others are not and that the West are taking sides in such a fragile and 
tensed situation that easily erupts into new clashes. Taylor’s lawyer, Courtenay 
Griffiths, stated rhetorically to the BBC (ibid20) that supporting rebels in another 
country is not a war crime because if it was then George Bush and Tony Blair would 
both be put at trial and further referring to historical misdeeds by the West. On the 
other hand, chief prosecutor Stephen Rapp stated to the same BBC reporter that if 
Taylor is prosecuted, it will send out a moral signal to other African leaders of 
international justice for the civilians atrocities and the ‘never again’ signal would be 
conveyed. Both Mr Griffiths and Mr Rapp might have one foot in the reality, but what 
remains is to see how this international justice system is seen by Africans themselves. 
In former colonial countries, it might be perceived as a new form of colonialism 
through perceiving it as ‘a white man’s court’ that punishes Africans and even 
Africans the West previously have supported.   
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 Downloaded 2008-05-28 at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/this_world/7259238.stm  
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 Downloaded 2008-05-28 at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6085536.stm  
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The efforts from the international actors mostly situated in the West have some long-
term goals that indeed are challenging to implement. The ideas can seem foreign for 
those they are meant for as well as the immediate challenge of funding the 
implementations. The following chapter will discuss efforts at the national level to 
discuss what the state in the DRC and Liberia might do to in the future prevent sexual 
violence. It is important to note that these efforts are closely linked to the international 
environment of what is acceptable on the development agenda.    
5.3.2 The national level  
 
Gender equality  
Gender equality among citizens is centred on changing people’s mindset of 
constructed ideas about men and women, thus a long-term strategy. In the long-term, 
there is perhaps a need to focus on changing some of the attitudes and behaviour in the 
national army as a solution for preventing sexual violence in war. Reforms in the 
military by sensitizing soldiers about gender equality could be a possible strategy to 
prevent further exploitation. Some authors argue, perhaps a bit naïve, that increasing 
the number of female soldiers can be a way of balancing the gender relations. In 
general, a soldier needs to be skilled for combat fighting since many operations are 
violent, but at the same time the soldier has to have skills to show patience and be 
conciliatory, according to DeGroot (referred to in Kent, 2007:56). He argues that few 
soldiers actually have these combined skills in the more recent wars in some of the 
African countries. This can result in the way that soldiers are not able to channel their 
aggression, and in particular to control sexual violence. DeGroot (ibid) argues further 
that by increasing the number of women in the military it will yield benefits in the way 
that they are believed to have greater capacity in calming stressful situations and are 
more hesitant in utilizing violence. It might also be beneficial to have more female 
police officers because women who have been sexually abused might prefer to report 
the incident to other women. Further, by increasing the number of women in 
traditionally more male-dominated professions some of the goals in gender equality 
are reached. The benefits might also result in preventing sexual violence by the army 
and the police as the use of sexual violence are found in the majority of cases to be 
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done by men. Perhaps can it also increase the focus on the subject and that the issue is 
dealt with more seriously.     
 
The practice, however, has shown little evidence in the DRC of these presumed 
benefits. In personal interviews with female FARDC soldiers, Baaz22 found that their 
existed practically no solidarity between the female soldiers and civilian women. 
Instead, Baaz found a high degree of group solidarity in the FARDC and the female 
soldiers also agreed with their male colleagues’ perception and use of sexual violence 
by revealing their contempt for the civilian women. According to Baaz (ibid), women 
are masculinised in military and they do not want any special treatment based on their 
gender. In the FARDC, they are a part of the hierarchy where they can control other 
soldiers without regard to traditional gender roles. Baaz even found that in Kinshasa, 
civilians are more afraid of female soldiers than male soldiers. However, the women 
had a much more conservative perception of their private life. At the household level, 
the female soldiers were housewives and their husband was the main authority. Of 
concern for the FARDC soldiers, according to Baaz, is that they do not have a sense of 
nation to fight for; they are not patriots willing to die for their country. This is related 
to the failure of a coherent state to connect with its citizens. One example was the 
efforts last year in November 2007 when FARDC soldiers were sent off to defeat 
Nkunda, the Rwanda based rebel leader, but instead fled because they were not well 
equipped and not willing to die for nation. Except for this, Baaz argued that the 
Congolese army is not any different from other armies in terms of their attitudes 
towards women and they are not admiring perpetrators of sexual violence. Further, 
there is a weakness in the argument in the way that it is assumed that the mere 
presence of female soldiers will make the ‘need’ for sex and hence sexual violence 
disappear among the male combatants (Wood, forthcoming).  
 
Though the DRC case of including women in the military or police forces have not 
been that successful, this does not necessarily mean that it is not worth pursuing 
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perhaps in different way. It is a goal usually spelled out among women activist groups 
and the UN that women and men in the nation should equally contribute to peace-
building. The challenge for both Liberia and the DRC is to actually have the necessary 
resources for following up on gender policies in the short-term and changing attitudes 
among the army and police force in the long-term. Neither gender nor human rights 
approaches today provides any form of monolithic model that can be appropriate for 
any society worldwide, as Crossette (2003:183) correctly points out.  She states that 
any approach of changing cultural practices should be looked at with a certain cultural 
relativism. With gender mainstreaming and the efforts of making both women and 
men’s voices heard in cultural perspectives, definitely complicates the picture. 
Crossette (ibid)argues that there is a good chance that men, from local police to 
national government, controls culture in the way that they neglect women’s demands 
“in the name of tradition”. She states that several cases where women have achieved 
development progress, there are often eminent men like local chiefs or a president that 
has the political will to make these women heard. Liberia in this sense is an example 
of such development compared to the DRC.   
 
Htun (2003:189) states that gender discrimination is something that has persisted and 
continues in most cultures. Women’s status has a tendency of being inferior relatively 
to men in terms of the economic, legal and social aspects. However, one should be 
cautious about the connection between gender-based discrimination and cultural 
attitudes despite the universality, according to Htun. Rather, it is important to 
understand whether and what part of a culture that can contribute in gender equality 
progression. A national strategy, on the other hand, might not be sensitive to cultural 
varieties and instead pursue the efforts from the international agenda. The results 
might not be very impressing as the long-term strategies of changing attitudes will not 
have any meaning for local people and thus not be accumulated in the next 
generations. In the case of Liberia, government officials and the AFELL has opened 
up the discussion about gender. The question, however, is who’s voices are we hearing 
in these efforts? In Liberia, it is without doubt the female Liberian elite.  Liberia has a 
strong group of elitist women with a history of American liberated slaves. Dorota 
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Gierycz23, who has been working closely with several female Liberian elites between 
2004 and 2007, argues that they are highly educated and often appear to be from a 
different world than the ‘native’ Liberian women. The elite women’s interests are not 
always to transform the entire country into a more gender equal society, but rather to 
achieve personal victories. Thus, their interests do not necessarily make any difference 
to the poorer rural women in Liberia and can at worst make an even larger disparity 
between the urban and rural women, at least in the short-term. Further, even though 
these Western efforts of achieving gender equality in poor post-war societies can be of 
best intentions, they might be shallow and without proper information campaigns and 
follow-up. The gender equality goals can strategically be focused on by the leaders in 
the targeted society, but in the way that it is used to gain economic and political 
support by prominent donors from the international environment.  
 
Human rights – women as second-class citizens?  
The second-class citizen term discussed in the analysis has been argued to be a cause 
of sexual violence as women are viewed as an ‘object’ belonging to the man and rape 
and other abuses therefore symbolically is a demonstration by the perpetrators to 
destroy their property. Being a second-class citizen would imply that despite the status 
as citizen, certain people are systematically discriminated against laws and other forms 
of rule; a situation clearly against the human rights perspective. In what is viewed as 
patriarchal societies, it is assumed that women are marginalized as a group to have 
restricted access to goods and resources like education and income-generating work. 
Since they are subordinate to men, they are also vulnerable to abuse by their superior 
husband if they are unfortunate to make a mistake. The patriarchal structure can 
legitimize violence towards subordinate groups as a form of demonstration of power 
and control. Violence can be accepted as a form of punishment if it does not leave a 
visible mark on the woman’s body. The subordinate status of women in some parts of 
Africa has also made women obliged to have sexual intercourse with their husband, 
which is viewed by many women’s rights activist as marital rape. If a woman becomes 
a victim of sexual violence in war in these societies it can cause feelings of dishonour 
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and frustration towards their husband, family and even their local communities. Thus, 
it is not the woman as an individual victim, but her position as a part of group in the 
household and society that experience a loss of status. She runs the risk of being 
socially rejected from the local community, which further have huge implications for 
the woman’s future life. With laws subordinate to her, little access to means of 
survival and a stigma attached to her, there are few opportunities for a return to a 
similar existence. ‘Survival sex’ might become the option for these women as these are 
the forms of payment she can access basic means for survival. As a sex worker her 
status in the society is even more at risk for the lack of protection and rights and thus 
becomes even further victimized in the society.  
 
Htun (2003:195) argues that there are considerable concerns about the gap between 
laws and behaviour in terms of gender-related laws that can further destroy some of 
the recent advances in women’s rights. In order to narrow this gap, she argues that it 
requires cultural adjustments and more profound changes within the legal system. The 
former laws in Liberia and the DRC have had examples of seeing rape as a form of 
crime against honour and decency and where marital rape is not a crime. The 1987 
Family Code in the DRC, which is based on Belgian colonial law, requires that any 
married woman must have the permission through their husband in order to seek any 
form of justice (see e.g. Rehn & Johnson-Sirleaf, 2002:101). But since the recent laws 
have changed, Htun states that this is form of channel for cultural shift. Sexual 
violence is no longer a private affair, but represents a policy problem under state 
power and formal laws. But the challenge remains to see if these formal changes will 
have any effect on the cultural behaviour. Challenging perhaps in particular in the 
eastern DRC where there is little state power control and where warring groups appear 
to outbid each other on extreme violence. At least in Liberia, there is more stability 
and less probability that the situation will destabilize.  
 
In general, these issues can be seen in a human rights perspective as related to the 
marginalization of women’s economic, social and cultural rights. President Johnson-
Sirleaf launched in 2007 Liberia’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), claimed 
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to represent the people, to deal with some of the development aspects that denies 
people their human rights (IMF, 2007:ii). The content of this strategy implies the end 
of neo-patrimonial rule replaced by the Western model of a state and also the focus on 
people-centred approach to development, all ideas fitting well into the international 
agenda of peace-building. The DRC have also officially signed the PRSP in 2006 with 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The problem with this 
strategy is that it is simply the follow up of failed programs like the Structural 
Adjustment Program (SAP), popularly termed the Suffering of African People, and is 
again a macro level initiative within the neo-liberal tradition. These strategies as a 
human right’s approach are more closely linked between the international and the 
national level, rather than directly to the local level since economic support and 
policies are given through the government. It is also unrealistic to assume such a quick 
withdrawal of the neo-patrimonial system into the neo-liberal demands set by the IMF 
and World Bank. A human rights approach through the national level must include an 
adjustment of people’s socio-economic and political conditions so that individuals’ 
capabilities are enhanced. Changes at the national level, usually implying more 
democratic governance, can lay the foundations for freedom among civilians to 
develop their capabilities in living the lives they prefer. But this in turn is conditioned 
by a strong state able to, for instance, provide for education to all citizens and increase 
job opportunities, which is currently a difficult task for both nations and in particular 
the DRC.  
 
A national justice system 
The states in the DRC and to some degree Liberia have demonstrated that they have 
authority over the capital and other major cities where the government is situated, but 
to a lesser degree further away from the capital where the state has less influence. In 
more remote areas, traditional and community leaders have more influence and these 
areas are more or less independent from the state. Since the states in some parts of 
Africa are incompletely institutionalized according to Western ideals, it entails both a 
closer and a more separate connection to society (Eriksen, 2001:29). The boundaries 
between public and private are more blurred, but the weak administrative capacity of 
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the state means that areas and in particular rural areas are beyond the reach of state 
administration. This situation is not ideal compared to international justice standards 
and there is put a lot of effort both internationally and to some degree nationally to 
change the national justice system in the DRC and Liberia.  
 
If the national justice system in Liberia was perceived as “weak” in terms of 
international standards before the civil war, including the capacity to try alleged 
perpetrators of crimes, it completely collapsed during the Taylor-government, 
according to Amnesty (2004b:21). Amnesty further states that the corruption and 
political intrusions have weakened civilians’ confidence toward the legal apparatus. 
This has been a problem for the development of a national justice system in the post-
conflict setting and it is evident that if Liberia is to build the system in accordance with 
international standards, they will need assistant from the international community 
according to Amnesty. The ICC have the capacity to trial some of the main 
perpetrators of crimes against humanity, but they have neither the resources nor the 
programmatic goal of being the substitute for a country’s national justice system over 
time. Thus, Liberia will be best served with a development of a national justice system 
in the longer term. The Rape Amendment Act came into action in January 2006 and 
includes a heavier penalty against serious cases of sexual violence (Human Right’s 
Watch, 2007b:132). Further, the Independent National Commission on Human Rights 
(INCHR) powered by the UN mission in Liberia (UNMIL) has a specific mandatory 
towards victims of sexual violence as well as child soldiers. These are two main 
human rights violations in both Liberia and the DRC.  
 
One of the problems in the DRC was that former laws were seriously outdated in terms 
of the situation since the outbreak of war in 1996 and onwards. The level of impunity 
has remained high from the colonial period until today, but the war situation has made 
the impunity phenomenon even more acute in the DRC, according to Pratt & Werchick 
(2004:17). The lack of individual rights as well as women’s rights are exemplified in 
the DRC law concerning rape victims that stated that rape is crime against the honour 
of the husband. The laws have been modified through lobbying and advocacy by local 
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women’s groups, international and local NGO’s, and several of the UN departments. 
The new rape law in 2006 has been one of those changes. However, the challenges are 
enormous concerning the legal issues of prosecution and sentencing for perpetrators of 
sexual violence. According to Pari24 in the Norwegian Refugee Council in North Kivu, 
some of the main challenges is that (1) the general public are not informed, (2) the 
DRC do not have the logistic means, (3) the lawyers do not support victims of sexual 
violence, (4) perpetrators are not actually convicted and (5) perpetrators are often 
found internally under the government and thus rarely prosecuted. Further, there is 
some sense of agreement in the DRC that the perpetrators should be punished, but 
there is little consensus on how this best can be accomplished. For instance, the many 
NGO’s working on the issues of justice and human rights often lack sufficient training 
concerning interviews and evidence-gathering and is also highly constrained by 
economic funding as well as the DRC’s lack of a functioning legal system. The few 
cases that has actually been brought to court are not sufficient for the victims to have 
confidence in the justice system. Pratt & Werchick (2004:17) found in their research 
that the survivors of sexual violence defined justice as being accepted by their families 
and communities and not as seeing their perpetrator being punished. This implies that 
there is a need to understand the informal social and cultural norms in the DRC and 
Liberia. Group identity and traditional justice systems is something that should be 
taken into considerations, which will be returned at the local level discussion.  
 
Despite the efforts at the macro level of justice, there are still several elements 
dependent of the individual level. First of all, individual victims have to identify their 
perpetrator, which is a huge challenge given the large number of militias operating in 
the eastern parts of the DRC as well as the chaotic situation during the civil war in 
Liberia. Through the interviews with victims of sexual violence in Bukavu, I 
discovered that all of them stated that it was the Interhamwe who had abused them. 
This was rather unreliable findings as the areas where the women came from have 
several other militias operating. Further, it is not easy to separate these groups from 
                                               
24
 Personal interview with Simona Pari, 2008-04-02, Goma. Pari is the protection officer in the Norwegian 
Refugee Council in the DRC.  
 79 
each other and even more difficult to name the individual perpetrators. Secondly, there 
is still an economic cost for individuals to prosecute alleged perpetrators that many 
cannot afford. Thirdly, there is the question of whether the victim actually will 
prosecute the case in terms of the stigma attached to this. This is especially true of 
cases where men have been raped or are forced to rape. Lastly, there is a great fear of 
being sexually abused again when perpetrators have been convicted, as a form of 
retribution. Of the few cases that have actually led to prosecution of perpetrators in the 
DRC, the offended runs the risk of revenge as a reprisal for the conviction. If the 
victim testifies, he or she returns home with the publicity and faces yet another trial 
among family and friends. Keeping it as a secret can be a way of protecting the 
surviving family and the husbands against ‘a damaged property’. In this way, the 
usefulness of support groups and local organizations should not be underestimated. 
 
At the national level the, efforts could be made to break the cycle of sexual violence, 
starting through the security and justice sector at the government level to deal with the 
continuing impunity. The problem is that the deterioration of the state has depleted 
institutions like the justice system. Judges can go unpaid and left with few other 
options than bribes and bails. Thus, proper payment is a first step to avoid corruption 
at the macro level. In the longer term, more female judges could be useful as well as 
experts on gender-sensitive issues to address more appropriately sexual violence as 
well as protecting victims and witnesses. Despite the fact that Liberia has more female 
lawyers, both of the countries have huge challenges in qualified personnel. The 
advantage for Liberia is that the comprehensive peace approach has been more 
successful in monitoring criminal cases. According to UNMIL25, the Monitoring Unit 
has been deployed in almost all of Liberia’s fifteen counties. The advantage, according 
to UNMIL, has been improved cooperation between the various justice sectors, from 
the police unit to the prosecution. The problem, however, appears to be that despite 
monitoring from local to national and to international level (basically UNMIL), there 
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are little evidence of cases that actually gets prosecuted. Reporting and monitoring is 
thus only a vast of resources if the information is not used.  
 
A monitoring unit like the one in Liberia is not found at the same extent in the peace-
building operation through MONUC. The problem of coordination appears to be more 
severe in the DRC and is also related to the lack of deployment of FARDC, PNC and 
in general to court systems in the vast remote areas where the main atrocities are 
taking place. Again, the lack of sufficient control in more remote areas questions the 
national justice approach to punish criminal acts. Further, the national army and the 
police themselves represent a danger for the civilians in terms of sexual violence and 
so the problem is internalized in the government. Another major problem is the 
inefficiency of the government in terms of widespread corruption and lack of a 
functioning juridical system. In addition, the so-called ‘civil society’ where people 
organize, lobby and demand action have a weak role in the DRC, according to 
Gardner26. The weak organizational culture is particularly acute among women and 
youth, first and foremost because they are the most marginalized segment of the 
society. Liberia, on the contrary, has a much stronger ‘civil society’ culture, especially 
through the female lawyers like the AFELL demanding rights and revising laws. A 
first step for the DRC, according to Gardner, would be that the government send the 
central leaders of rebel groups to trial to set a juridical standard and show that they 
want to deal with issues of impunity. Instead, central actors that have committed 
crimes against humanity are been integrated in the government and/or have received 
amnesty for the crimes. This is not a viable solution in the longer term, but it might be 
the only solution at the short-term to stabilize countries in conflict.   
 
Liberia has dual justice system compromising both the traditional systems, traditional 
in the sense that it represents local understanding of justice, and the national justice 
system that is more related to international law standards. Johnson-Sirleaf together 
with former foreign minister of Finland Elisabeth Rehn (2002:101-102) argue that the 
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traditional justice systems together with the national court system will work as 
complementary, and sometimes alternative, systems of justice. The local systems are 
usually less costly and work faster than the national system. The important matter, 
according to them, is that the local systems are adherent to the same principals as 
international human rights standards. However, the concern is that the systems will 
continue discriminatory attitudes towards women in comparison to human rights 
standards. One worry is that even though changes are made from the top level it is not 
given that the laws will translate itself into legal terms. The changes will depend on the 
different religious and cultural variations in Liberia as well as the DRC. Hence, we 
will now turn to a discussion on the local level. 
 
5.3.3 The local level   
Gender equality  
The development in the post-conflict setting in Liberia has included gender equality as 
one of the top priorities for not only preventing sexual violence, but also to reach 
development goals through gender equality. The unequal power relation between men 
and women as it is argued from the analysis above opens up for sexual exploitation. If 
the women are a form of ‘property’ and hence perceived rather as an ‘object’, 
achieving development goals like equal access to education and work are unlikely. The 
widespread use of sexual violence in the civil war in Liberia had paradoxically the 
effect of a starting-point to challenge taboos that before had kept women silent when 
sexually abused. Since so many women had fallen victims of rape and often in a public 
display in the wartime context, the individual woman could get feel less responsible 
for the rape and the peace agreement signed in Ghana in 2003 in Liberia was a, 
however small, starting point for addressing gender issues.  
 
The development of gender equality goals in the DRC has been less clear compared to 
Liberia. At the more local level there exist some clear gender inequalities. During a 
group discussion between Congolese men and women at a conference in Oslo, I was 
able to observe some of the dynamics and disparities that existed in their 
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understanding of Congolese women’s possible contribution to peace building.27 One of 
the men argued that the political culture in the DRC traditionally subordinate women 
as well as children in relation to men and was perceived by him as fully legitimate. He 
argued that since the laws in the DRC stated clearly that married women should not 
have an income above 50% of the husband’s average income it was legitimated at the 
highest level of a nation, i.e. the state. His opinion was that the democratic and gender 
equal system in Europe was not something you could implement in the DRC, because 
it was simply not in their culture. Large protests from the Congolese women in this 
group discussion followed. One of the women argued that though this was the 
tradition, it was not something that they wanted in their culture. She argued that it was 
viewed by them as discrimination and it is something negative in their culture that 
should be dealt with. Though they agreed that simply replicating European efforts in 
gender equality was not an option, more efforts should be made to use some of this 
thinking and implement it in the Congolese context to become their culture. However, 
these Congolese women’s perspectives are not meant to be representative for all the 
women in the eastern DRC. The female victims I met in Bukavu were not in any way 
near that conscious idea about their individual situation. These women had lived their 
entire lives in rural areas and married as child or minor. With war followed by sexual 
violence, their lives were completely precluded.  
 
As a starting point to work with gender equality matters for rural and often uneducated 
civilian women can be to make them aware of their situation and so that the women 
themselves can be attentive to specific parts in their lives they want to change. If 
policies of gender equality are simply something forced upon them, the efforts might 
not have any future prospects and be a waste of resources. Following Sen’s (1999) 
argument of the capability approach, the people-centred development focus on when 
both women and men themselves can recognize their functionings and lack of 
functioning so to speak in the social, political and economic environment. Instead of 
being passive receivers of aid, people’s agency and their freedom to develop is central 
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to dealing with the root causes of their deprivations. The reality for many Congolese 
women living in conflict areas and to rural Liberian women is that their socio-
economic and political context denies them the freedom to develop. Therefore, it could 
be argued that the international agencies can provide some support in changing this 
situation, for instance like Resolution 1325. Resolution 1325 opened the door for equal 
participation with more women participating in the peace agreements. The main 
achievement with the Resolution 1325 is often more support from the international 
agencies to local initiatives, often referred as ‘civil society’. But still the lack of 
understanding of the local context and how it best can be applied can make the 
Resolution 1325 end up solely as document and not a tool with any practical impact. 
Though women’s participation is highly encouraged as means to peace and a 
democratic goal, the effective participation of women have been rare in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. It remains a challenge for women to this date to enter the room of negotiation 
and reconstruction planning for a more inclusive development. The general picture 
entails rarely women in peace negotiations, perhaps because they did not have any 
leadership roles prior or during the conflict, meaning that women did not have a 
specific constituency as a leader of a rebel group. The focus in peace operations in 
effect remain on those parties that have the possibility to resort to violence if their 
perceived interests are not met in peace agreements. The UN’s efforts have a tendency 
of not effectively incorporating gender at all levels of their programs, but instead make 
specific gender focus under the label ‘women’s projects’, thus further reinforcing 
marginalization of women in the development process.   
 
Human rights  
One of the main critiques of the human rights so-called universality is that human 
rights are culturally dependent. The anthropologist Melville Herskovitz (in Pirjola, 
2005:5) even went as far saying that the using human rights as a standard for 
individuals and nations are not only an impossible task, but also an imperialist project 
that should be stopped. He argued that an individual can only develop his hopes, moral 
values and his meaning of life in close relations with his own culture. What is right 
and wrong in this view cannot be derived from outside of one’s own culture. Liberia’s 
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commitment to the human rights approach is mostly found at the national level, while 
continues violations of human rights are committed locally. This is also one of the 
main limitations of the human rights approach is that the key channel of coordination 
and communication is between the international and the national level, thus further 
marginalizing the local and rural settings. At the local level there are more emergency-
based efforts from various NGOs and INGOs. These are often efforts needed, but in 
order to make the long-term goals of human rights and gender equality achieved, their 
human capabilities must be enhanced above the mere survival level. In the DRC 
context, the concept of human rights seems foreign to the Congolese people, according 
to Mosely28 who has been working with the civil society in the South Kivu in an effort 
to increase the awareness of rights and equality. The main reason, according to her, is 
that they have never been treated that way. The human rights concept seems absurd in 
terms of the situation on the ground. According to the relativist debate about human 
rights, one main argument seems to be that Western concept of human rights can be 
meaningless to non-western communities (Pirjola, 2005:7). One clear example 
following the relativist approach is that human rights are basically focused on 
protection of the individual, while ignoring that the group identity or the community 
has a key role in many cultures. Further the Congolese culture in Mosely’s point of 
view is not sensitive towards issues of sexual violence. There is an unwillingness to 
own the problem and it is thus perceived as a foreign problem arriving with the 
Rwanda genocide. From my personal experience with local Congolese civilians in the 
eastern DRC, the issue of sexual violence was constantly stated to be something that 
did not belong to the ‘Congolese culture’. One person even stated that ‘traditional 
warfare’ in the Congo separated women and children from combat targets and avoided 
atrocities of these civilians. The use of sexual violence as a weapon in war was 
brought in with Rwanda influence, according to this person and several others. In 
general, the picture seems to support the arguments that sexual violence exploded after 
the war and with the interference from other nations. However, Mosely argues that the 
conditions in terms of gender inequality were set before this genocide, but it went 
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completely down hill after the war broke out. Mosely argues that this is related to the 
lack of an idea of self compared to the strong group identity and also the unwillingness 
to own the problem that further results into impotency.  
 
The human rights approach can best be achieved if the marginalized sections of the 
society, specifically the ‘native’ women in Liberia and the rural women in the DRC, 
are actively included in the peace process. Following the GAD approach, their role as 
agents in peace-building can lead to substantive changes in gender identity and 
awareness. It also strengthens alternative development models instead of continuing 
the failures of former models. The challenge for this approach is to develop the social 
capital among marginalized civilians where the exclusion is most enduring and where 
the current situation often have deteriorated their situation. Rural areas are often 
excluded in the process for changes at the national level, despite that these areas often 
represent the battlegrounds for warring groups. Instead of directly trying to link social 
movements at the national level, actors can start at the local level through their family 
and communities and ally with other women to coordinate social movements. The fact 
that the wars in Liberia and the DRC have thorn down the social fabric of the 
community and reduced survival strategies might not only represent new challenges 
but also opportunities for women to change their situation at the family and 
community level. In order for these women to succeed in changing their situation and 
the communities, it is central to have a common goal or objective other than mere day 
to day survival. One central aspect here is the civilians’ structural vulnerability that 
allows the continuation of violence as well as the normalization of violent behaviour 
affecting the rural population. Addressing directly these inequities in human 
capabilities implies that the marginalized section of society should be in the centre of 
human rights development leading to sustainable peace. But more than one common 
objective, the human rights approach includes a democratic condition where various 
people can freely express and promote their interests at all levels; locally, nationally 
and internationally. The marginalized women in Liberia and the DRC must hence 
perceive themselves and convinces others as political actors with decision-making 
power.  
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Local justice  
A lot of emphasise is put on international standards of human rights law and the 
national level of a justice system, while much less literature stress the issue of local or 
traditional justice systems. Local justice runs the risk of being neglected at the 
international level of policymakers and donors. Since both Liberia and the DRC 
traditionally has had a neo-patrimonial system where politics is not based on formal 
institutions but rather on linkages between patron and clients, other local systems of 
justice have played a key role at the individual and group level of society. These 
systems varies considerably but usually functions as norm setting for groups at the 
local level. Liberia has the dual system of justice at the national and local level, as 
referred to above. Schia29 states that the traditional systems work in the way that the 
judges’ role is usually to function as a mediator to solve a charge between two parties. 
Justice is here based on local traditions and practices, which can have the downside of 
overlooking marital rape and female genital mutilation (FGM), both defined as gender-
based violence, since these can be a part of the local customs and not considered 
crimes. The Liberian government in 2000 revised their rules and regulations for the 
hinterlands that acknowledge that tribal chiefs can continue to govern if the type of 
governing is not contrary to Liberia’s law (Revised rules and regulation governing the 
hinterland of Liberia, 2000:17). From these rules and regulations it is evident that 
taking other people’s women is a severe crime. According to several human rights 
organizations in Kinshasa, Goma and Bukavu that Baaz & Stern (forthcoming) 
interviewed, rape was seen as a serious crime before the war. Though such crimes 
never (or rarely) reached the national courts, it was considered a severe crime locally 
not only towards the individual girl or woman but also against the family and 
sometimes the community if the perpetrator was an outsider. Traditional systems 
punished perpetrators differently either through compensation for the victim(s) or a 
shaming processes. However, these traditional systems were disintegrated due to the 
outbreak of war in 1998. The results have been impunity at all levels that in turn have 
entwined sexual violence into a normal behaviour and increasingly found to be 
committed by civilians. In both cases, the disintegration of local authorities and 
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community structures due to the war can be seen as factors contributing to rampant 
sexual violence. Even though these local justice systems are not satisfactory compared 
to international law standards, they are indeed worth focusing on as they seemed to 
have a moral and stabilizing effect of local crimes. The development of international 
standards of human rights and international law will most likely be a long-term goal, 
as demonstrated in the Western states and it is a considerably time-consuming effort to 
implement a different mindset in societies. Local justice can have the benefits of 
achieving justice sooner (and cheaper), but will depend on the reintegration of 
civilians and community leaders and thus on the end of violent conflicts and 
stabilization of concerned areas. Further, since the Congolese from the fieldwork 
stated that the widespread use of sexual violence was something that exploded with the 
foreign troops and not conceived as a part of the ‘Congolese culture’, the issues should 
then also be addressed by the nations involved in this conflict, specifically referring to 
Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi.    
 
It can seem farfetched to focus on local justice at the individual and group level when 
those who often are victims of these atrocities in many cases do not even have basic 
livelihoods to survive. The millions of lives lost in the DRC are mostly due to indirect 
causes of the war like starvation and diseases linked to peoples’ vulnerability when the 
local safety nets in societies are disrupted and people are looted. What was one of the 
most disturbing impressions from the fieldwork in the DRC was exactly that civilians 
whom already lived at subsistent livelihoods where looted of their small properties 
(pots, clothes etc) and on top of that humiliated and stigmatized with sexual violence. 
Given that the traditional local justice systems were integrated in the DRC, they would 
unlikely have the capacity and the necessary means to pursue and make perpetrators 
account for these crimes. The Liberian justice system also have many limits, but there 
seem to be better communication between the national and local justice system 
considering the revised rules and regulations on Liberia’s hinterland referred to above. 
In addition, the situation is much more stable and less tensed compared to the DRC 
thus making it possible for communities to reintegrate.  
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5.4 Lessons learned or the end of humanity?  
There is still a tendency of assuming that every society will be faced with the same 
macro-level political challenges identical to the development of the modern state in 
Western Europe. Liberia has perhaps been viewed recently as ‘a poster child’ because 
of the political will to transform the war-thorn country into a democratic and more 
gender-equal society. The international community on several occasions emphasize 
that Johnson-Sirleaf is the first democratically elected female president in Africa. Her 
official non-tolerance statements about the highly stigmatized subject sexual violence 
have been applauded by especially those working with gender issues. This is all good 
and very politically correct. However, the focus on the political leadership has perhaps 
overshadowed considerations of local communities and people’s attitudes. There is no 
secret that Johnson-Sirleaf is scoring points by taking it seriously and talking about 
successes achieved. The local context with cultural complexity and lack of 
opportunities can sometimes appear to be ignored when international standards are 
required in post-war societies where these standards never have been a part of the 
general public.  
 
The atrocities in the eastern DRC have been termed the end of humanity because of 
the brutality towards civilians and what appears to be an unending spiral of violence. 
More than five years after the signing of a peace agreement, the DRC is still in the 
middle of humanitarian crises where the mortality rate is considerably higher than the 
rest of Sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, there are severe immediate implications that need to 
be addressed to restore humanity in the Ituri and Kivu regions. At the longer term, the 
lessons learned from similar cases like Liberia, Rwanda and even Bosnia has first and 
foremost been more debate about gender issues and an increased awareness at the 
international agenda. This has led to specific programs that target for instance gender-
based violence, impunity and raise awareness campaigns and empowerment projects 
through education and skills. These are efforts that fit well into the GAD approach. 
But the question remains to see if these approaches will be meaningfully implicated at 
the local and national level. The lack of coordination of policies due to financial 
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problems and cultural disparities from the international level to the national and local 
level is found to be one of the main obstacles for both cases.  
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6.0 Conclusion  
The situation in the eastern DRC is devastating in terms of the widespread incidents of 
sexual violence in this war. However, the available literature on this subject  have a 
tendency of representing non-state armed groups as barbaric monsters out of control 
and women as passive victims. This is at best erroneous and at worst will make the 
circle of violence continue despite international engagement. An article in the New 
York Times exemplifies this simplistic representation of sexual violence in the DRC:  
 
“There used to be a lot of gorillas in there, but now they’ve been replaced by much more savage 
beasts.”  
(Gettleman, 2007-10-07). 
  
Instead, sexual violence is committed by individuals and must be understood in terms 
of these individuals’ contexts and goals. Researchers should be aware that individuals’ 
motivations can appear irrational, and categorizing these incidents in ‘lust’ or ‘hate’ 
can seem to artificially separate mutually excluding rational behaviour. At the 
individual level, there seemed to be a mixture of feelings combined with constructed 
ideas about men and women’s role in the society that motivated sexual violence 
against civilians. Further, the rebels in the eastern DRC are rarely equipped with 
sufficient means to survival and groups like the Interhamwe have been there for more 
than a decade. The groups prey on civilians and in particular target women because of 
their productivity and abduct them as a livelihood strategy. There is also reason to 
assume that sexual violence against these women happen because the rebels need 
‘normality’ in the unfriendly environment. Many of these men never had the chance to 
experience a ‘normal’ life with a wife and children and their morality is weakened in 
terms of taking other men’s women. Notably, this action is in many cases a serious 
offend in peaceful circumstances. There is also reason to believe that sexual violence 
is used as a weapon to terrorize people into fleeing areas or as a power tool to scare 
people into submission. Though, few if any of these groups are strong enough to win 
the war, there are conflict entrepreneurs everywhere in the east profiting on the lack of 
control over resourceful areas. The failure of the neo-patrimonial system has 
contributed to this eruption of violence and the lack of control over more remote areas 
 91 
that both foreign and national actors profits from on the cost of civilian casualties. 
Civilians who already were living at subsistence level face an even more vulnerable 
situation and there should come as no surprise that the war has cost millions of lives. 
Sexual violence in addition has contributed to the social trauma among affected 
civilians and can be a severe block to development. This thesis has contributed to 
some of the understanding at the same time acknowledging that motivations for 
committing acts of sexual violence are probably as diverse as there are cases.  
 
The lessons learned from Liberia can appear to be to more shallow than how the 
international community and the national actors prefer to present the situation. But 
first, it should be acknowledged that the situation in Liberia today can be perceived as 
much more stabile compared to the DRC. Liberia has indeed impressive political will 
at the top level of the government, but traditional customs of neo-patrimonialism 
continues and there is still widespread discrimination towards individual based on their 
sex and kinship, specifically recalling the legal separation between ‘civilized’ and 
‘native’. This discrimination is not in line with neither gender equality nor the human 
rights approach. Essential for future international involvement against atrocities in the 
African region is that the operations and policies introduced should become more 
nuanced and context sensitive. Culturally constructed ideas of masculinity and 
femininity have failed to be included in many development policies, which have from 
time to time made the situation worse for the development targets. Further, assuming 
that implementation of international standards of law and human rights will prevent 
sexual violence is naïve. The development of the modern state is a history of violence 
including sexual violence and there is no prove that a liberal democracy has ever 
ended this type of violence. Sexual violence is still a tabooed subject and is one of the 
most underreported crimes in the Western world, despite individual rights and 
competent legal systems.  
 
The policies implemented from the international community often lack sufficient 
funding and time to penetrate the entire society. The local and more remote areas in 
both the DRC and Liberia often have received far less benefits from the international 
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agents than their government leaders. If human rights, gender equality and stronger 
institutions are penetrated more thoroughly in the entire population, then there is more 
likelihood of enhanced capabilities among the civilians at all levels of the society. 
People outside the patron-client link often lack the capability to actively change their 
socio-economic and political situation. Though the international efforts are contested, 
there are both short-term and long-term considerations that the UN and other agencies 
can support in order to repair damages and prevent violence from reoccurring. With 
the interstate conflict in the DRC combined with vast resources available for warring 
groups, there is less chance of immediate solutions. Increasingly in the DRC, warring 
groups move away from overarching political goals to pure bandit groups plundering 
civilians and profiting from the impunity. These are severe concerns that daily 
deteriorate the situation for civilians.   
 
What was witnessed in Bosnia and Rwanda was concluded with ‘never again’, as if 
these experiences taught the international community to react in time. In these wars, 
sexual violence as weapon of genocide sent shockwaves through the Western world. 
The international laws changed as a reaction to the horrifying violence. However, there 
has been a saying in the African continent that what is for others ‘never again’ is for 
them ‘à la prochaine’ or ‘until the next time’. When people fled the Rwanda genocide 
and into the DRC, much of the international attention focused solely on feeding the 
refugees instead of taking out the génocidaires of the refugees. The tension in the 
Great Lakes region should preferably been dealt with at a much earlier stage instead of 
waiting until full scale interstate war had lasted for more than two years. 
Internationally, these are indeed what should have been the lessons learned from 
former atrocities.  
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